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Essential Traits for the Economics of Network and ICT: 
Theory and Practice 
 
Introduction 
 
Recent rapid developments in technology seem to overcome boundaries in life, but the 
world is still governed by natural law as discussed in John Bates Clark (1915) and Leibowitz 
(2002). Technologies change the world seemingly at the speed more than we can feel it. 
However, the telecommunications market tends to be a “captive market” that suppliers 
let customers in a certain circumstances, and customers must choose from the selection they 
offer like shops in an airport or a station after “checking-in”. In other words, they ask customers 
to accept additional or collateral conditions to use their main service. There is no choice for 
customers to arrange their own contracts freely according to their preference or usage. 
This thesis analyzes the characteristics laying rapid developments in the ICT 
(Information and Communication Technology) industry, especially in the telecommunications 
market. For that purpose, we consider a cost incentive exploring characteristics in the contract 
between operator and customer, and the relationship with/between additional factors 
normatively and positively. The analysis shows how those “captive” attitudes affect the market 
and interact with influential and additional factors. 
In chapter 1, we review a historical background of privatization and liberalization of the 
market in 1980’s, and clarify theoretical characteristics from earlier literature. Chapter 2 also 
reviews the characteristics of the market in the ICT era theoretically, and bridges the cost 
reduction incentive in earlier literature to the cost incentive in question. Chapter 3 analyzes 
empirically the incentive of practices implemented in the market taking those factors into 
account. Chapter 4 also analyzes recent telecommunications market empirically.  
Above all, this thesis shows that the market that formerly considered as a structural 
issue now turns to a practical issue of the operators, and the incentive in the market affects 
competitive circumstances. 
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1. Background: The Regulatory Issues and Discussions of Price in 1980’s 
 
1.1 Background on Incentive 
 
Chapter 1 reviews the historical background on regulations for traditional 
telecommunications market. In its early stage, the market was mostly owned by the government 
and controlled by the regulation 1. Therefore, as Joskow (1973a, 1973b) pointed out, what 
matters most was the “threshold” the regulatory agency set. This chapter also reviews the 
existence and its definition of the incentive in the traditional policy measures.  
As for incentive, we follow the assumptions by Ramsey (1927) using the Pigou’s 
terminology that private and social net products are equal by the government interference not 
included in the taxation; we take the existence of the taxation a policy scheme or a contract in 
our case discussed later. In other words, the profit maximization implies cost minimization in 
the competitive market. We assume that the cost incentives exist in the difference between the 
outcomes of the objective functions caused by the existence of those schemes. The difference in 
the outcomes is an excess profit that may distort the competitiveness in the market. 
As Baron and Myerson (1982) discussed, the historical policy measures in this chapter 
modify the market from the first best solution by implementing optimal regulation considering a 
socially expected goal. So we stand at the starting point to discuss here how the difference is 
realized under each schemes as following chapters. It is important to note that we have to 
clearly distinguish between effects come from competitive market and the excess profit come 
from factors seemingly outside the market.  
Following sections review past policy tools to clarify its purpose, effects, and what 
caused those effects.  
 
1.2  The Price-Cap: United Kingdom 
 
1.2.1 The Historical Review 
 
Here we overview the drift of the discussion until the Littlechild Report based on 
Beesley (1993, 1997). Fixed phone and postal services in the UK were operated by British 
Postal Office (BPO) until 1981. BPO had improved their equipment under restrictions set by 
British Ministry of Treasury. Beesley and Laidlaw (1993) pointed out and explained three 
1 The review in this chapter is based on an earlier review, Kobayashi (2010). 
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points that showed the status in 1981; (1) poor quality of services, (2) delays to modernize 
national network, and (3) difficulty for customers in obtaining permission of the most recent 
equipment. 
The BPO was responsible literally for postal and telecommunications, which had wide 
range of responsibilities. Therefore, the operator at that time did not pay attention to marketing 
and customer relations.  
In modernization, ignoring demand on simple services and its equipment like answering 
machine caused poor quality in services. The digital switching equipment was also developed as 
a major national project, but they consequently procured the equipment from overseas and its 
introduction was delayed.  
In 1980, Beesley, a professor of London Business School, proposed an assessment for 
liberalization of VANS (Value Added Network Services), and published the Beesley Report in 
January 1981, which allowed freeing resale and entry into the market to get more competitive. 
Consequently, this report caused that the telephony tariff in local call went up and that in long 
distance lowered so called cross-subsidization. 
In July, the 1981 legislation passed as the British Telecommunications Act 1981 and the 
divestiture between postal and telecommunications was accomplished. As a result, BT (British 
Telecommunications plc.) was established. At this point, BT had an exclusive privilege on 
public telecommunications services and a right to give permission to other operators. Therefore, 
control were overlapped by the government and BT. The government anticipated other 
operators to enter VANS, but there was no clear classification between fixed telephone services 
and VANS. 
While the Littlechild Report proposed the price-cap regulation, the report referred to the 
rate-of-return regulation shown in section 1.3 and evaluated other possible regulatory schemes. 
The report was written in 1983 for the Telecommunications Act. The purpose of the report at 
that time was to remove the BT’s privilege in section 12 of the 1981 Act, and to treat BT as the 
licensed private firm. Therefore, promoting competition by removing the privilege and offering 
services by other operators were expected by the Littlechild Report.  
As a result, the 1984 Telecommunications Act passed, and liberalization spread to 
VANS. Interconnection was also allowed in 1985. Those events caused that BT had to 
concentrate on basic service like telephony. The independent regulatory agency Oftel (Office of 
Telecommunications) which was established in 1984 set the RPI-X formula to assess retail price 
of the charge. This regulation called the price-cap regulation. The charge was calculated by the 
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service price basket selected in advance by the agency. Operators allowed to set its price 
flexibly according to profitability within the range of the cap. 
 
1.2.2 The RPI-X 
 
An issue in the regulation is the one in setting the rate of “X”. The reason of setting the 
rate was never opened to the public, and the agency just explained that they concerned lots of 
factors on price. Table I-1 shows the changes in X. What the Littlechild Report concerned was 
the benefit of reducing local call charge. The idea was coming from a discussion of regulation 
for other area before liberalization. The RPI-X formula was applied to the monopolized service 
charge, and the agency tried not to raise its price over (RPI-X) %. As a result, the agency 
decided to set 3% in X, but the process of the decision was not open to the public. 
However, in 1986, there was an argument that BT’s profit was excessive even under the 
regulation. The agency claimed it was appropriate, and the price was set below its upper limit 
for two years. In 1989, the agency changed the level of X from 3% to 4.5%. For fear of BT’s 
high profitability in international call, the basket included international call in 1990. The rate 
was changed to 6.25% in September 1991, and BT reduced their profits for the first time after 
privatization. Furthermore, the rate of X was reviewed according to phased increase of the rate 
of return in capital in 1993, and reviewed again to 7.5% until mid-1997. 
After mid-1997, the rate of X was reduced to 4.5% for relaxation of the regulation 
toward its removal. The rate of 4.5% was expected to continue until 2001, but extended to mid-
2002. The cap was changed to RPI-RPI until May 2005, and changed again to RPI-0 after that. 
To avoid rapid price increase caused by the removal, the agency confirmed competitiveness in 
telephony market and the regulation was removed in July in 20062.  Following subsections 
explain what happened in each term according to the rate of X. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 For further its process, refer to BT’s Annual Reports 2006. 
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Table I-1 Changes in RPI-X 
 Terms Effective RPI-X (%) 
1984-1989 RPI-3 
1989-1991 RPI-4.5 
1991-1993 RPI-6.25 
1993-1997 RPI-7.5 
1997-2002 RPI-4.5 
2002-2005 RPI-RPI 
2005-2006 RPI-0 
Source: Cave (1997), BT Annual Reports 
 
1.2.3 The 1984-1991 Era 
 
Since 1984, the market in the UK had been promoted competition by Oftel3. Until 1991, 
participants of the market which could operate national and international calls were the only two 
firms: BT and Mercury. This period was literally the era of duopoly. 
During this era, Oftel decided interconnection conditions in October 1985, but 
conditions were asymmetric. Services offered by Mercury could provide through BT’s network, 
but agreements were needed to provide Mercury’s services to BT’s customers. Consequently, 
Mercury could open its way to gain customers in metropolitan area anyway. While Mercury’s 
local call charge was 20% less than that of BT’s, the charge of calls to areas outside London 
became higher than that of BT’s.  
Therefore, Oftel had to consider Mercury’s access deficits 4  coming from 
interconnection fee, and made an effort not to charge it to customers. In other words, the 
interconnection fee became a burden for entrants unless charging it to customers. The 
interconnection rule was an important issue not only for competition but also cooperative 
actions in the market. 
 
3 By the Communications Act 2003, the regulatory agency in the UK was reorganized to Ofcom. 
4 Access deficit is the situation where the amount of the interconnection fee paid to the incumbents 
excesses that received by the entrants. The issue of the access deficit was discussed in Armstrong 
(2002); Beesley (1997); Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a, 1998b). 
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1.2.4 The 1991-1997 Era 
 
In the 1989 Review, the government changed the duopoly policy to competition to deal 
with issues faced in 1991. In November 1990, the UK government announced to start reviewing 
duopoly policy, and the review was formally published in March 1991 by Department of Trade 
and Industry. In the review, the UK government decided to end duopoly policy. They issued 
licenses to 150 new entrants at that time. 
 The main market in this era was still fixed telephony market. The number of 
subscribers increased rapidly because of the decline of retail price due to the cap. While this 
rapid growth, the mobile market started up in this era as shown in figure I-15. Developments in 
communications technology explored possibilities like VANS.  
The mid-1990’s was a turning point for telecommunications industry in the UK. The 
diffusion of the Internet caused some increases in demand not only for telephony service but 
also communications services using computers as shown in figure I-2, I-3. Although its 
charging scheme was at a certain level of affordable rates, higher knowledge and skills were 
needed to use the Internet through user interface (UI). So, the difficulty prevented from 
diffusing the Internet6.  
 
1.2.5 The 1997-2002 Era 
 
In 1997, the rate of X was changed to 4.5% from 7.5%. Oftel released the status in 
October 2000, which stressed some improvements in competitiveness. But still BT kept at the 
level of 60-70% market share7. The fixed telephony market was allowed pre-selection services 
that customers could choose an operator in advance, and there is no need to push specific 
numbers to call from the operator chosen. This policy also fueled competition to gain new 
customers and switch operators. 
Instead of existing ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Line) that communicates over 
PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network), Operators introduced xDSL (Digital Subscriber 
Line) that uses residual bandwidth available in copper cables.  
5 All figures is this section are shown at the end of the section. 
6 At the same era, Microsoft introduced Windows 95 and made people easy to access to the internet using graphical 
user interface (GUI). This event exploded its demand to diffuse exponentially. 
7 Refer to Oftel annual Communications Market Report in the year 2000. 
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Unlike ISDN, xDSL made possible to charge at a flat rate because there was no 
technological limitation caused by the bandwidth. Few people subscribed to xDSL yet in this 
era, but the number of subscriptions grew rapidly in the next era. 
 
1.2.6 The 2002-2006 Era 
 
The regulation moved forward to its removal from 2002. As shown in figure I-8, 
duration time of local and long distance calls fell drastically, so the circumstances in the market 
also changed rapidly. Unlike the 1990’s, the number of fixed subscription decreased drastically 
as shown in figure I-6. On the contrary, the number of mobile subscription grew exponentially 
as shown in figure I-7. 
A data communications service like xDSL showed rapid growth in figure I-9, while the 
growth of existing dial-up was declining steeply. As shown in figure I-10, households’ 
expenditure for the communications service drastically increased based on the expenditure in 
1995. The talk time in the fixed line also fell drastically at the same period as shown in figure I-
8. These might be caused by the growth of the data communications services. The CPI 
(Consumer Price Index) in figure I-11 showed a drastic decline in price of the telephone and 
telefax equipment, which was caused by the supply for the strong demand in the market. The 
flat-rate charging scheme could help the strong demand because of the easiness to introduce 
those services. In addition, innovations brought drastic decline of the equipment price, which 
contributed to the reduction of its price. 
Furthermore, as shown in table I-2, the changes in the overall change in price started to 
rise after the rate effective since 2002. However, breaking down the CPI data shown in figure I-
11, the decline of the equipment price showed more drastically than that of the service prices. 
Therefore, the decline of the equipment price contributed more to that of overall retail price. 
This implies that the price-cap was not necessarily the cause of the decline because the price 
drop in the equipment was too drastic to figure out that the cause of the decline simply came 
from the price drop in the services. 
While subsection 1.2.6 showed that the price-cap worked for the reduction in retail 
price, the retail price rose as the policy moved toward the removal of the regulation. In other 
words, we might be hard to figure out where the decline came from while customers could feel 
the decline in retail price. Therefore, the experience of the price-cap in the UK shows that we 
have to break down the change in the price and figure out the cause of the decline. 
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Table I-2 Changes in Influences of the Cap and the Price Changes after the Cap 
  
Changes 
of RPI 
(%) 
Rate 
of X 
Required 
Reduction 
in Price 
(%) 
Overall 
change 
in 
Price 
(%) 
1995 3.52 7.5 -1.38 -1.82 
1996 2.14 7.5 -4.92 -4.92 
1997 2.94 4.5 -1.56 -1.56 
1998 3.75 4.5 -0.73 -0.73 
1999 1.35 4.5 -3.24 -3.24 
2000 3.32 4.5 -1.2 -1.2 
2001 1.93 4.5 -2.5 -2.5 
2002 2.33 2.33 0 0.14 
2003 2.89 2.89 0 -0.19 
2004 3.03 3.03 0 0.46 
2005 2.8 0 0 2.8 
2006 3.2 0 0 3.2 
2007 4.4 - - 4.4 
2008 4.6 - - 4.6 
2009 -1.6 - - -1.6 
2010 5.0 - - 5.0 
2011 5.0 - - 5.0 
2012 2.8 - - 2.8 
2013 3.3 - - 3.3 
Source: BT Annual Reports, Office for National Statistics 
 
1.2.7 The Market Circumstances realized by the Price-Cap 
 
Until 2010, BT’s market share had been above 50%, which shows that BT still have 
great market power to influence the market. As shown in figure I-12, the price-cap worked well 
to reduce retail price according to the rate of X. As shown in figure I-13, the number of BT’s 
unbundled local loop had increased exponentially since 2005. This implies that the BT’s local 
loop may have a strong market power because the revenue shares of the local call had been 
above 50% until 2009 in table I-3. As of 2007, local loop unbundling was completed and 118 
operators were in service in the telephony market through Public Switched Telephone Network 
(PSTN) as shown in OECD (2009)8. In the same data of OECD (2013)9, the number is down to 
less than 50 PSTN operators in service, and the number of fixed operators in total was also less 
8 See the numbers shown in table 2.1 of OECD (2009). 
9 See the numbers shown in table 2.1 of OECD (2013). 
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than the number in 2009, which might have some concerns on competitiveness in the fixed line 
market. Although optical fiber network grows rapidly these days, the fixed network still 
contributes not only to telephony service but also communications services like xDSL. 
Furthermore, services available through fixed lines like PSTN are bundled in a package, 
so called “Triple Play”. The package provides telephony, data communications, and video 
service, but some operators offered more services to bundle. This practice works not only to 
lock customers in but also to increase their revenues.  
Thus, BT’s revenue share dropped to below 50% in 3Q of 2009, and its yearly data are 
shown in table I-3. The status of competition can be measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI)10. HHI of the local call is shown in table I-3. Ordinary quantitative market share is not 
enough to examine the effect of price-cap. To take price factors into consideration, revenue 
share could be appropriate to examine not only the effect of the price-cap but also that of 
competition after the price-cap era as shown in table I-3. 
In the consideration of the HHI, we assume the intuitive market status described as the 
“pseudo” HHI11. The revised HHI might be close to the actual sense of the status because the 
owners of the equipment are network operators like “major players” listed in figure I-3, and the 
services offered by the small entrants through the equipment seem not to be in the same 
conditions as those of major players. We know this assessment is a little bit rough to handle it, 
but we can show how different what consumers feel and the actual status of the market. 
We have to note that the lessons from this section may be applied only to the fixed line 
market for the consistency in our analyses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10  HHI is an index to measure the degree of monopoly in a market. The index is calculated by the 
summation of squared number of shares in the market. The index of zero is perfectly competitive market, 
and 10,000 is perfectly monopolized market. 
11 The “pseudo” HHI is assumed that there are only a few major players only in the market listed in the 
table I-3. The reason for this assumption is that most new entrants are mostly small in the size of the 
network, and it is hard to offer the same conditions or better as major players do. That is why, we 
assume the case where it is negligible for customers to choose offers by small operators. In our case, the 
HHI is calculated simply by operators except the share of “others”. 
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Table I-3 Geographic (local) Call Revenue Shares by Operators & HHI 
Geographic Call Revenue Share by Operator & HHI 
  BT ntl: Telewest Virgin media others HHI 
2000 67.2% 13.5%   19.4% 5069  
2001 63.0% 15.1%   21.9% 4675  
2002 65.1% 15.1%   19.8% 4859  
2003 64.8% 13.8%   21.5% 4845  
2004 60.9% 13.9%   25.2% 4538  
2005 56.8%   13.7% 29.5% 4285  
2006 54.8%   13.0% 32.1% 4210  
2007 56.1%   12.8% 31.2% 4278  
2008 55.0%   11.8% 33.2% 4270  
2009 54.7%   12.1% 33.2% 4240  
2010 46.8%   17.2% 36.0% 3784  
2011 47.0%   16.4% 36.6% 3818  
2012 47.2%   15.7% 37.0% 3850  
* Data includes (unlimited) dial-up connection 
Source: Ofcom Telecommunications Market Data Tables 
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Table I-4 Call Revenue Shares of “Major-Players-Only” Market and the “Pseudo” 
  HHI 
Geographic Call Revenue Share by Assumed Bundled Operator & 
HHI 
  BT ntl:Telewest Virgin media HHI 
2000 67.2% 13.5%   4694  
2001 63.0% 15.1%   4194  
2002 65.1% 15.1%   4469  
2003 64.8% 13.8%   4384  
2004 60.9% 13.9%   3904  
2005 56.8%   13.7% 3417  
2006 54.8%   13.0% 3177  
2007 56.1%   12.8% 3306  
2008 55.0%   11.8% 3168  
2009 54.7%   12.1% 3137  
2010 46.8%   17.2% 2486  
2011 47.0%   16.4% 2476  
2012 47.2%   15.7% 2480  
* Data includes (unlimited) dial-up connection 
Source: Ofcom Telecommunications Market Data Tables 
 
1.2.8 Remarks 
 
In section 1.2, we reviewed the influence and the contribution of the regulation through 
the case of the United Kingdom. The price-cap is one of the major examples of market 
liberalization in the 1980s. From our review of the case in the UK, we reassured that the price-
cap has an incentive to decrease price, and it had been working effectively till the end of the 
regulatory scheme. 
  And the equipment in local loop in the UK is legitimately unbundled, the proportion of 
the exchanges ready for the unbundling is favorably increasing. As we also pointed out in table 
I-3, the call revenue share implies that local loop has still been offered by BT at the high 
proportion. So a large share of the local loop network in the UK is still controlled by BT, and 
that seems to have been unchanged since the nationalized era. 
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While the regulation has an incentive to lower the price, the structure of the local loop 
seems not to be changed regardless of the market structure. The lack of the change in the local 
loop may cause the access deficit.  
The reason why the entrants hesitate to enter the local loop is that a large amount of 
capital is necessary to build and maintain their own network and services. The access deficit 
becomes a burden for entrants and tends to be charged directly to customers. 
As the eras we classified according to the rate of X, each era was led by the variety of 
services and the strong demand. The demand could be brought by the price drops. The price-cap 
is not major policy instrument in recent years, but its effectiveness may still work for the market 
in a different way. 
Reviewing the case of the UK shows that it is necessary to consider further on 
innovation; the efficiency between installed base and new adopters with more compatible goods 
or standards12. All those topics are discussed further in chapter 2. 
 
<Figures> 
 
Figure I-1 1991-1997 Number of Mobile Subscription 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
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 Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions (Digital) 
 Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (Mill.) (per 100)
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Source: ITU World Telecommunications Indicators 
12 Normative approach is discussed by Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986). The discussion shows “excess 
inertia” and “excess momentum” exist. The excess inertia is an effect that a widely-used efficient 
standard or technology tends to keep using even though a more efficient newer technology is invented as 
the case of QWERTY keyboard. The excess momentum is the one that the early adopters called installed 
base momentary incur unavoidable costs if the newer standard is adopted. Katz and Shapiro (1986); 
Greenstein (1993) also discussed in the same kind of approach. All those topics are discussed further in 
chapter 2. 
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Figure I-2 Changes of Subscribers & ISDN Channels in 1991-1997 Telephone Lines 
 in Operation 
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Figure I-3 Number of Fixed Telephone Lines in Operation 
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Source: ITU World Telecommunications Indicators 
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Figure I-4 1998-2002 Number of dial-up and xDSL Subscriber 
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Source: ITU World Telecommunications Indicators 
 
Figure I-5 Total fixed telephone subscribers accessing the Internet from 1998 to 2002 
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Source: ITU World Telecommunications Indicators 
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Figure I-6 Numbers of Fixed Telephone Lines in Operation 
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Source: ITU World Telecommunications Indicators 
 
Figure I-7 Number of Mobile Cellular Telephone Subscribers 
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Figure I-8 Number of Fixed Telephone Talk Time 
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Source: ITU World Telecommunications Indicators 
 
FigureI-9 Number of Dial-up and DSL Subscribe 
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Source: ITU World Telecommunications Indicators 
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Figure I-10 Changes in the proportion of households’ expenditure for Communications in 
OECD country 
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Source: OECD Communications Outlook 2011 
Figure I-11 Trend of harmonized indices of consumer prices (HICP) for   
  CommunicationEU-25 
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Figure I-12 Changes in the Rate of X and the Retail Price under the Price-Cap 
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Figure I-13 Number of Unbundled Local Loops 
 
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
 
 Number of unbundled local loops(Mill.)
 
Source: OECD Communications Outlook 2011 
 
18 
 
March 2014 
 
 
 
1.3 The Rate of Return: United States 
 
1.3.1 The Historical Review 
 
The United States implemented the fair rate of return regulation to optimize the 
operator’s profit. They can earn normal profits though the rate of return (ROR) regulation. This 
implies that they could not earn excess profits if the market was under perfect competition. 
Therefore, the regulation allows a certain amount of profits that can be offset by the capital 
investment in a long term. The return under the regulation that relates closely to the amount of 
capital investments should be the minimal for fear of interference by the regulation. So, the 
regulation was implemented to the operators formally owned nationally. Section 1.3 considers 
the effect of the ROR and its background. Next subsection 1.3.2 reviews the discussion of 
Averch-Johnson (1962) and how the ROR works effectively.  
 
1.3.2 The Review of the Averch-Johnson (A-J) Model 
 
The ROR regulation was discussed by Averch and Johnson (1962) considering a firm 
under the constraint by the regulation. The goal of the ROR was to set an optimal regulation for 
public utilities to encourage the market to competitive circumstances, but the A-J model showed 
that the regulation needed to care about the price level realized in advance. In other words, 
considering the regulation with a clear goal and its process was the key to the effectiveness of 
the regulation.  
In earlier literature on the ROR regulation, Bailey and Malone (1970) showed that the 
profit maximization firm tends to overcapitalize, while sales or output maximizing firm tends to 
undercapitalize. Klevorick (1971) discussed the A-J model using normative and statistical 
approach. Takayama (1969) also pointed out that we should notice that we could not tell until 
the shift direction of the marginal product of capital curve is clarified. Sheshinski (1971) 
showed a necessary condition to be utility maximizing solution. 
Our goal in this subsection is to confirm the effectiveness of the ROR and figure out 
how the ROR is applicable to the market. One of the problem in the A-J model is the optimality 
in costs.  
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The A-J model has two possible situations to bring; 
 
 At the competitive level, the operator could sell below marginal cost to 
increase profit, then the operator builds assets and installed base. 
 The regulatory agency allows the operator to set a price above the 
regulatory level. 
 
In either case, the operators can set the price arbitrarily according to their strategy or 
financial situations. Therefore, the consequence directly affects consumers. Sappington (2002) 
also pointed out 8 drawbacks on the regulation: 
 
① “[L]imited incentives for innovation and cost reduction” 
② “[O]ver-capitalization” 
③ “[H]igh cost of regulation” 
④ “[E]xcessive risk imposed on consumers” 
⑤ “[C]ost shifting” 
⑥ “[I]nappropriate levels of diversification and innovation” 
⑦ “[I]nefficient choice of operating technology” 
⑧ “[I]nsufficient pricing flexibility in the presence of competitive pressures”. 
 
To review the regulation, we need to review every point of the drawbacks, and consider 
close relationships between drawbacks. We consider the profit maximizing firm under cost 
minimization, 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐾𝐾 − 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐿𝐿. 
 
The profit of the operator comes from the revenue minus cost of the two factors, and The ROR 
formula expects the revenue to be equal to the total cost spent as  
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 = 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 = 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 × 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅. 
 
For optimal regulation, the ROR formula above can be that the profit is zero and the 
circumstances can be described so as to balance between the profit and the allowed return under 
the regulation, 
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𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐿𝐿 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 × 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅.  
 
The ROR regulation is the optimal regulation considering only the efficiency of the rate 
base which is observable to us. Moreover, the realized optimal situation in the A-J model 
implies that the unobservable factor L is also optimal. Consequently, the price of the market 
under the regulation can be calculated and set in a way that the rate base is multiplied by the rate, 
and divided by the quantity. In sum, the A-J model shows that the ROR solves the problem of 
observability in cost by the regulation.  
 
1.3.3 Remarks 
 
In all, this section reviewed the model of the ROR and we found some points to 
reassure. First, the ROR regulation could be effective to keep a certain market situation and to 
control the market. However, the problem of cost observability may continue to exist if the 
market situation goes more competitive for profitability by cost reduction.  
For its feasibility, another key for the ROR is to find out the level of the favorable 
profitability under the ROR. Through the realized level of the optimal regulation, to what level 
of the price might be affordable or favorable for customers. Observations and considerations for 
this aspect are critical. However discussions on the level are outside of our discussion. 
Second, as for operators assumed in their model, we may have a room to have the cost 
reduction incentive in two cases; when the incentive is at the level of the optimal regulation, and 
when the incentive away from the optimal regulation level. In other words, there is a room to 
reconsider the cost observability. 
Furthermore, it is hard to assume the homogenous customer who is defined as a typical 
customer and to track each customer’s preference because recent services are well differentiated 
in price. Therefore, most regulatory agencies in developed countries gave up using policy 
adjustments or considering the optimal circumstances by the regulation because it was difficult 
to assume a certain customer and a market situation in reality. 
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1.4 Review of the Critical Changes in the Market Trends 
 
1.4.1 Policy Oriented Market to Competition 
 
As we reviewed in previous sections, first one is the change from policy oriented 
market to competition, which is our biggest event in the history of the market. In the case 
1980’s, the UK passed the Telecommunications Act, and the liberalization in the market spread 
to VANS. While interconnections were allowed between operators, BT had to concentrate on 
basic service like telephony at the early stage of the liberalization. The regulatory agency Oftel 
set the RPI-X formula to assess retail price of the charge. The policy oriented market control 
literally adjusts or modifies the market situation deliberately. 
In the case of The US, they implemented the ROR to optimize the operator’s profits in 
the 1980’s. The rate of return (ROR) regulation implies that they could not earn excess profits if 
the market was under perfect competition. In the ROR, a certain amount of profits could be 
offset by the capital investment in a long term, though the problem of observability may exist. 
In recent years, the convergence among networks and services using the Internet 
Protocol (IP). Policy makers are trying to take advantage of new capabilities to improve better 
circumstances in view of affordability and equity. Most countries have acknowledged the 
increasing influences of broadband networks, and the governments are preparing for more 
availability of not only fixed network but also mobile network. Figure I-14 shows that the 
growth in revenues and the number of access paths increases rapidly as the spread of the 
broadband. As we can see also in figure I-14, the levels of the two factors between the 1980’s 
and 2000’s are apparently different because of the rapid growth. 
Furthermore, taking a constant level of investment taking into consideration in figure I-
14, the resource allocation for the investments is of a great concern because operators need to 
invest efficiently to build a telecom network as a whole under the convergence between 
networks and services through IP.  
Therefore, recent policymakers are trying to encourage operators to implement more 
innovative solutions for networks and services rather than to control the price or the market in a 
certain direction. 
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Figure I-14 Subscriber, Revenue and Investment Growth, 1980 – 2011 
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1.4.2 Fixed Network to Mobile Network 
 
As shown in subsection 1.4.1, recent rapid revenue growth may come from the 
availability of accessing to the Internet. Figure I-15 shows that the total number of IP traffic in 
2011 was more than ten times than that in 2005. This ten-fold phenomenon happened only in six 
years. As shown in figure I-16 and figure I-17, the cellular mobile traffic continues to grow in 
both the UK and the US. Although the share of the mobile traffic was small in the global IP 
traffic, the rapid growth of the mobile use showed that the mobile network plays a critical role 
for the recent market trend. 
Therefore, figure I-18 shows how operators earn revenues against the change of the 
trend to mobile network. The trend of revenue source is about to change from fixed network to 
mobile network. On the traffic side, the share of mobile data traffic is very small, but the 
revenue share is almost even in 2011 though we showed in figure I-15.  
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Taking the share of the mobile traffic into consideration, these data suggest that the cost 
for the use of mobile data might be extremely high compared to that for the use of fixed 
network. Nonetheless the convenience and the influence of the mobile network against our lives 
are getting better and greater day by day, which may be implied in figure I-19. The constant 
investments in figure I-14 also suggest that it is hard to catch up with the exploding demand for 
the mobile traffic use. 
 
Figure I-15 Global IP Traffic, 2005-2011 
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Figure I-16 Cellular Mobile Traffic in the UK 
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Figure I-17 Cellular Mobile Traffic in the US 
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Figure I-18   OECD Share of Mobile and Fixed Telecommunication Revenues, 1998-2011 
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Figure I-19 Wireless and Fixed Broadband Subscriptions in OECD Countries 
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1.4.3 Telephony Communication to Data Communication 
 
 As shown in figure I-6 and figure I-20, the number of fixed telephone lines is 
decreasing drastically. Consequently, figure I-21 shows that not only the number of the fixed 
lines but also that of access paths to the Internet are decreasing in OECD countries. 
 In the process of this trend, the way of communication changed from voice 
communication through telephony service to the data communication including voice through 
the Internet such as VoIP (Voice over IP) and SNS (Social Network Service). Although the 
talking minutes through telephony service are also decreasing shown in figure I-22 and I-23, but 
the people who have a wireline subscription may replace to the optical fiber network. The 
subscription of fiber network are offered bundled services that include voice, data, TV, and 
more services at affordable price. Consequently, this trend can be seen in figure I-24; fiber 
network attracts people by offering bundled services. 
 
Figure I-20 The number of Fixed Telephone Lines in the US 
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Figure I-21 Net Additions of Fixed Telephone Access Paths (analogue + ISDN lines) 
between 2009 and 2011 
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Figure I-22 Domestic Fixed-to-Fixed Telephone Traffic 
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Figure I-23 Long Distance Fixed-to-Fixed Telephone Traffic 
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Figure I-24 Percentage growth in communication access paths, by technology, 2009-11 
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1.4.4 Remarks 
 
We reviewed three critical changes for the market that we need to take into 
consideration. Each of these changes influences not only our lives in every aspect but also the 
market. 
The change to competitive market shows that policy makers are now trying to 
encourage operators to implement more innovative solutions rather than to control the price or 
the market in a certain direction. The more those factors are implemented to the market, the 
more difficult we calculate or evaluate those values in price and quantity though the innovative 
solutions that bring more convenience or profitability. The influences are brought by those 
innovative factors. So, the influences should be distinguished between the one from the market 
and the other from the innovations. 
The change from fixed network to mobile is the biggest change in the history and the 
market. While the change is a chance to break through an old regime that causes negative effect 
for the market, the unexpected conflicts between the old regime and the expected innovative 
system or regime may well happen to rule the market. As we can see the historical reviews in 
this chapter how to eliminate the negative impact caused by the old regime, the trend that shifts 
to the mobile network makes the objective of policymaking change to encourage competition 
rather than continue to control the market. 
Although the last change was brought mainly by the change of the trend to mobile 
network, the ways of communication drastically changed from voice communication through 
telephony service to the data communication using VoIP and SNS. The change of 
communication media affects competitive circumstances in the market as the talking minutes 
through telephony service decreases. 
Chapter 2 considers some factors so called traits that causes externalities and we 
reviews how those factors influence the market. We go further to consider those influences and 
how the influences work each other. 
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2. The Essential Traits 
 
The telecommunications market plays a key role for building a society with ICT, 
conveying or providing information as data which is sometimes in forms of voice, picture and 
movie through network. 
This chapter considers the characteristics of network in economics and we pointed out 
the difficulties in policymaking. We also discuss the externalities of network and its 
characteristics as follows: compatibility, critical mass, path dependence, installed base and 
switching cost, and entry deterrence. Finally, we argue about policymaking in view of network 
externalities.  
 
2.1 Network Effects 
 
2.1.1 Compatibility 
 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) analyzed the effect of externalities through cost and demand 
considering static one period oligopoly model that consisted of two type of costs: cost of 
production and cost of achieving compatibility. We assumed that the fixed cost is constant 
regardless of the size of the network as an externality. Thus, they set the equation of a price 
according to the expected size of network. This section finds some points to argue about 
compatibility. 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) showed that the customers’ expectations are of great 
importance discussing the expected size of the network shown by the Cournot equilibrium, 
which the output level can be chosen when the expected size of the network is given. This 
assumption showed that the network size that customers expected is equal to a Cournot 
equilibrium. Consequently, they considered the size of the network when the expected size of 
the other group is fixed. They used a unique concept of reaction function called the equilibrium 
reaction correspondence that showed i’s best response to the other group. Using this concept, 
they showed the existence of the externalities and its indirect effect13.  
13 Katz and Shapiro (1986a, b) considered the externality focused on the price affected by a technological 
factor, and showed how it changes the price. Katz and Shapiro (1992) showed that the excess inertia has 
an incentive in the externalities, but insufficiency is the cause of the effect. They considers the 
insufficient function and its condition. Katz and Shapiro (1994) considers the externality in reality, and 
they pointed out that the market inefficiency is unclear and difficult issues arise in policymaking. Bental 
and Spiegel (1995) showed the largest network is of the highest value, and the price could be priced 
highest level. This result in the situation that people in the network would be only the richest one. Choi 
(1994) considers dynamic model of the technology change. 
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To ensure the effect of compatibility, some cases of its definitions are summarized as 
 
 At the time of compatible, the model shows the relationship that the 
expected size of the network is equal to the expected number of customers. 
 the expected size of the network = the expected number of consumers 
 
 At the time of incompatible, the model shows the relationship that the 
expected size of the network is equal to the expected total output. 
 the expected size of the network = the expected total output 
 
For complete incompatibility to be an equilibrium, the value of the other 
group depends on the value of the customers in the group according to the 
number of the other group. 
 
 For partial compatibility, the expected value of the compatible part is 
equal to the additional value for the other group as the incentive so that 
the expected value of the compatible part of the network depends upon 
how  large the other group. 
 
Therefore, we reviewed the effectiveness of compatibility in the market under the 
assumptions as follows, 
 
 If the size of the network is equal to the expected total output, this implies 
that the expected value of the network is equal to the willingness to pay 
for the market that customers have.  
 
 If the size of the network is less than the expected total output, this 
implies that customers in the network can get more profit or additional 
value than that from an additional customer itself.  
 
 If the size of the network is more than the expected total output, the 
opposite case of the former case, this implies that an additional customer 
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not necessarily brings an additional output or less value than the value 
brought by the additional customer. 
 
Above all, the expectations play a critical role for the increase in the value of the 
network. In other words, the expectations bring more expectations themselves and so do to the 
values for the network. This consequently brings more outputs. 
To go further discussion, chapter 3, and 4 examine empirical considerations to prove 
what situation the telecommunications industry is in and how the policymakers think about the 
situation, problems, and its possible solutions. Next subsection considers how to determine the 
highest value of the network and how it works in the market. 
 
2.1.2 Critical Mass 
 
The former subsection 2.1.1 showed that the expectations matter in compatibility. This 
section focuses on the number of customers in a network. Economides (1995) and Economides 
& Himmelberg (1995) followed the discussion of network externalities, which defined the value 
of a good that depends on the number of consumers purchasing the same good. There is a 
critical mass point in goods with network externalities, and the point is defined as “the minimal 
non-zero equilibrium size of a network good”. They showed that the critical mass point is 
independent from the market structure.  
In the review of the definition of network externalities by Katz and Shapiro (1985), the 
expected size is equal to the actual size, and the willingness to pay increases with the number of 
units sold. The analyses show that the fulfilled expectations demand schedule does show 
upward sloping especially at the points where the network coverage is small or where the 
network starts building. However, the market does not exist at the points. The market exists 
when the size of the networks once reaches the critical mass.  
Therefore, the possible critical mass point we see in their models may be chosen the 
highest, in another word, the critical network size that is Pareto dominant for the existence of 
the network. Some possible situations may be explained by the models. For a natural monopoly 
firm, they could always stand a position where is on the part of downward sloping after reaching 
at the critical mass for profitability. In the downward sloping state, the demand schedule follows 
the ordinary economic theory, and the state implies the cost also decreases according to the size 
of the network. For entrants, the network of the entrants may not exist as long as the entrants’ 
network reaches. Therefore their investment never be realized before reaching the critical mass. 
33 
 
 
 
The considerations on critical mass show that a network exists when in a significant size 
and then, the cost starts reducing as the size of the network grows. This implies that a difficulty 
arises when a network has strong network externalities.  
To establish a network like telecommunications network, a significant size of the 
network is of great importance. In view of telecommunications policy, a network does not exist 
until the deployment of the network reaches the size of the critical mass.  
Their models also imply that the early adopters especially during a period to achieve a 
critical mass point might cost more than adopters after reaching at the critical mass size of the 
network. This means that the imbalance of costs between early and late customers. This 
discussion follows in section 2.2. 
 
2.1.3 Path Dependence 
 
This subsection shows that the “lock-in” occurs according to historical events or 
accidents regardless of its relevance to the efficiency or rationality. Paul David (1985) explained 
the lock-in through QWERTY keyboard standard and examined its reasoning of path 
dependence in three aspects: technical interrelatedness, economies of scale and quasi-
irreversibility. 
Technical interrelatedness requires system compatibility between hardware and 
software, which customers consider expected value depending on the availability of the product. 
The choice of customers affects the historical paths so that the subsequent customers choose an 
inefficient technology like QWERTY standard. Consequently, the economies of scale which 
shows that the decreasing cost schedule works and the number of customers using the 
inefficient technology increases. 
Finally, quasi-irreversibility in investments showed an asymmetry between the cost of 
software and that of hardware. The asymmetry implies that the cost of software to guarantee the 
compatibility in products increases while the cost of hardware decreases because the hardware 
conversion is cheaper to obtain its compatibility in practical sense. The analysis of David (1985) 
emphasized that interferences may well exit so that firms may make wrong decisions for the 
products. Arthur (1994, 1989) showed that there is a market where customers are hard to 
determine which equilibrium to choose in the static oligopoly model with multiple equilibria. 
The model of Arthur (1994) assumed two technologies adopted by a large number of 
consumers and the regulatory agency classified by preferences. And it showed that it is hard for 
the operator to change from the one formally selected to a more efficient technology because the 
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benefits gained from early adopters with existing technology are still larger than those gained 
from new adopters with a new technology. In the model, the difficulty is caused by the 
“historical small events” defined as the set of events that are out of knowledge.  
The historical small events in a model of increasing return have potential 
unpredictability and inefficiency because the externalities exist in the set of choices. Each 
choice affects the subsequent choices and its gains between the early and new customers or 
adopters after each event. 
The judgment whether the choice is right or not can be defined as the path-efficiency. 
The path-efficiency could be examined whether the profit of the choice is larger than that of the 
other option. On the other hand, each judgment has nonergodicity that means the judgment is 
not necessarily rational and inflexible outcome by the lock-in technology; the gap of returns 
between choices becomes larger due to innovations. Consequently, the judgment becomes no 
longer path-efficient. 
Through the discussion of path dependence, historical events that are out of knowledge 
in advance bring the lock-in situation especially in the increasing returns case as we saw in the 
case of critical mass. 
 
2.1.4 Remarks 
 
In all about network externalities, things we should be taken into consideration most are 
compatibility and expectations. The compatibility guarantees the value and the size of the 
network socially shown at the installed base consideration. Policy for encouraging compatibility 
should be considered, not coercively but promoting competition attractively.  
Secondly, the expectations matter for the increase in the value of the network more than 
that according to the number of customers or the total output. For the competitive circumstances, 
interconnections between networks are of great importance in practice. For fear of losing share 
of the market, the dominant firm may make barriers to entry or set some interferences somehow 
to keep its share. Chapter 3 and 4 considers some factors in practice interfering the 
competitiveness. 
As Economides (1996) implied, the policy for network externalities depends on 
situations to what extent the industry is matured; unbundling would not work well when the 
dominant network is not large enough to be preferable industrywide in the existence of critical 
mass. The practice of unbundling without discretions of the externalities may become the 
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market with the lock-in because the efficient network and technologies could never spread or 
even exist due to the lock-in.  
 
2.2 Installed Base 
 
2.2.1 Installed Base with an Old Technology and New Adopters with a New Technology 
 
The former section 2.1 followed the existence of the critical mass point characterized by 
upward sloping at the early stage. Farrell and Saloner (1986) and Farrell and Klemperer (2001) 
discussed about the installed base with old technology and new adopters with new technology. 
Their assumption showed that all users have opportunities to select to adopt new 
technology. Taking practical sense into account, it is necessary for the size of network to take 
time to grow. Their models considered the game between users adopted at different times, and 
they considered the benefits between the installed base with the existing technology and later 
adopters with newer technologies. Through their models, they analyzed two externalities: the 
decision of installed base and the effect of available options for later adopters. And the analysis 
explained further the two externalities through four effects: excess inertia, excess momentum, 
bandwagon effect and penguin effect.  
 
 Excess inertia is an effect that the benefit of switching new or superior 
technology cannot be fully obtained unless users of the installed base 
switch to the new or superior technology.  
 Excess momentum is an inefficient technology adoption for those who are 
willing to adopt the new technology even though a network with the new 
technology will take long time to be established.  
 Bandwagon effect is an effect that once a set of users choose a technology, 
the same choice is more preferable to other users who choose the same 
technology.  
 Penguin effect is an effect that each user may think that others move first 
even though users are willing to switch.  
 
One of their models, a game model with new user showed that the adoption is a perfect 
Nash equilibrium. Any person cannot gain by changing in their strategies under given strategies 
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of others even when the benefit of the network with the new technology is greater than the 
benefit of users with the existing technology. 
Therefore, the difficulty in adopting a new technology arises in the case of excess 
momentum. The case showed that the loss, for both the installed base and the later adopters by 
the adoption of the new technology, is too large in spite of the small benefit from it. Farrell and 
Saloner (1986) also showed the same difficulty because of the existence of the installed base 
itself, not by the new technology.  
As the models implied, the new technology should be compatible so as to encourage its 
transition from the old technology. During the transition, the benefit of the installed base could 
start getting smaller as the number of the installed base gets smaller. 
Consequently, the decrease of the benefit gained by the installed base is of a great 
concern if the loss incurred by the early adopters is greater than the benefit of new adopters with 
the new technology. The penguin effect also needs to be concerned not only to cover the loss 
and to keep the network attractive by eliminating the hesitation. 
Therefore, this section shows that it is important to consider the compatibility between 
customers with the old and the new technology. A discretion for transition to the new 
technology by policymaking may well work for the loss of the installed base. Next subsection 
considers the cost of switching and its effects. 
 
2.2.2 Switching Cost and Lock-in 
 
Subsection 2.2.2 shows the same influence as section 2.2.1 in view of the switching cost. 
The cost of switching arises when, for example, a technology changes to another technology. 
The presence of the switching cost may lock those who are willing to switch in the existing 
group. 
An analysis of the switching cost by Klemperer (1988) in the duopoly model showed 
the effect of the incumbent after an entrant with switching cost came into the market. In the one 
period model, he assumed the market that the switching cost is the only barrier to entry. The 
two-period model by Klemperer (1987) showed that the demand with the switching cost is 
inelastic than that without the switching cost. In assumption of the first period, a firm chooses a 
price to maximize future profits where the price of another firm is given. Some customers may 
face the lock-in situation for fear of the switching cost.  
The analyses implied that the existence of switching cost expected in the second period 
makes market in the first period less attractive. Even the firms offer an affordable price in the 
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first period, customers know the rise of the price in the second period. Therefore, competition in 
the first period may become fierce to lock consumers in in each firm.  
The consideration shows that the market share in the second period is less than that of in 
the first period because the dominant firm is more interested in consumers who choose them 
again in the second period. This implies that the dominant firm may offer some better offers to 
stay. 
Another case in which the taste change of the switching cost in the second period shows 
that the more new consumers joins, the less efficiency the preferences of the existing customers 
have. The analysis showed that switching cost could lock the installed base in. The more 
customers change their preferences, the more competitive circumstances could be brought into 
the market. 
For policymaking, the analyses implied that policymakers should consider to control or 
eliminate the switching costs because the irrationality may exist. Therefore, Policymakers 
should guarantee the easiness in switching firms.  
 
2.2.3 Remarks 
 
The existence of switching cost may attract customers when the operator set a rebate at 
the same amount as the switching cost. Under the structure that the switching cost exists, the 
dominant firm may act to eliminate the entrant offering benefit to stay in the dominant firm.  
Taking structural aspect into consideration, policymakers should establish a market 
structure or circumstances controlling or eliminating switching cost, especially when the cost is 
irrational to be imposed and therefore interferes transition of consumers to other carriers or 
technologies offering better conditions. This implies that the effective policymaking should 
consider examinations not only in the structural aspect but also in a behavioral aspect.  
In some developed countries, the dominant firms have local loop networks because of 
historical monopoly ownerships. The dominant firms try to control the market structure to take 
advantage of the dominant position. However, some countries considers that the local loop is an 
essential facility that cannot be established by other carriers because of its scale. 
Section 2.3 considers how policymakers work for the barriers to introduce competition. 
Considering the local loop was a major policy issue arising from prospected entrants with new 
technology and services. 
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2.3 Entry Deterrence 
 
2.3.1 The Review 
 
This section 2.3.1 reviews the analysis by Klemperer (1987) that the characteristics of 
switching cost deter entry. We also consider the characteristics through the model and could see 
the possibility that there are some points needed for policymaking for the market. 
He assumed in the two-period duopoly model with switching cost where no 
differentiation occurs except switching cost and the demand curve shows downward sloping. 
Customers expect rationally about the future price and the Cournot equilibrium in the second 
period becomes a market price for the two firms.  
Klemperer (1987) considered the behavior of the incumbent that is the firm already 
entered in the market. He showed that the number of incumbent’s sales in the second period is 
fewer than that in the first period when the entrant’s output is high. When the output is within 
the range between the highest value of the entrant’s output and Cournot equilibrium output, the 
incumbent sells no one but first period consumers. When the output is too low, the sales to new 
consumers cover the loss caused by the old consumers. 
When the switching cost still goes up, a discontinuous figure of the switching cost 
implies a possibility that the incumbent may stick to the quantity in the first period and try not 
to increase consumers. The incumbent also may act to reduce the entrant’s quantity according to 
the relationship between the reaction functions. Further rise of the switching cost may show that 
the new consumers may go to the incumbent. So the entrant may be in a situation where the 
entrant cannot enter because entrant’s expected network value may become too low to cover the 
cost to build their own network.  
Subsection 2.3.2 reviews that the local loop unbundling contributes to eliminate 
structural barriers and restrictions toward competitive circumstances. 
 
2.3.2 Local Loop Unbundling: the United States 
 
In the United States by the end of 1970s, FCC (Federal Communications Commissions) 
promoted competition in the long-distance market so that new entrants can enter. This 
movement was caused by the fear that the regulatory regime does not work enough to eliminate 
barriers in the market like cross-subsidization where firms offer lower or attractive price to 
consumers in a competitive market and impose high price in a monopolistic market or a 
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dominant market so as to discourage entrants to enter. The possession of the local exchange 
enlarges the barrier to entry as the bottleneck facilities and gives a reason for the 
anticompetitive behavior. 
Since divestiture of AT&T in 1984, promoting entries was attempted in the local loop 
market in the US due to fierce competition in the long-distance market. FCC prohibited the 
cross-subsidization between competitive services and monopolistic services within local 
exchange by RBOCs, regional Bell operating companies, or giant AT&T. Therefore, the way of 
thinking to provide local and long-distance services, pre-divestiture understanding that RBOC 
would be naturally monopolistic were not suitable to implement it. By implementation of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the legal barriers to entry in the local loop market had been 
removed. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 proposed restructuring of telecommunications 
industry “so as to make available, as far as possible… at reasonable charges” in the 47 U.S.C. 
§1. The Act took consumers into consideration to prevent them from monopolistic tendency and 
risk that are shown historically. 
Considering the telecommunications network in the US, a closest network to consumers 
is the local network called the local loop that has the bottleneck problem to introduce 
competition. Without the introduction of competition in the local loop, the local exchange 
carriers, LECs, may use a monopoly power to eliminate entrants and rivals in its related market 
by offering high price for the local loop and control the related market like the long-distance 
market by way of cross-subsidization14. In the Act of 1996, the act required the incumbent local 
loop carriers (ILECs: Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers) to provide the unbundled network 
elements (47 U.S.C. §251 [c]) that consist of seven elements: switching, local loop, interface 
devices, transmission facilities, signaling network and call-related databases, operation support 
system, and operator services and directory assistance15. 
The Act also required in the section 251 [c](3) that carriers offer nondiscriminatory 
access to network elements in certain conditions where are technically feasible and reasonable. 
This obligation showed that local network becomes unbundled not only hardware like switch or 
loop but also software like services offered by carriers to enjoy benefits of unbundling. But the 
structure of telecommunications network still causes structural barriers to encourage 
14 Cross-subsidization is the way to balance between profitable segment and unprofitable segment in a 
firm. This is applicable to any organizations in business literally to subsidize to the segment in debt and 
covers the debt from the profit gained from profitable segment internally. 
15 OECD. 1996. Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996; Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service 
Providers, First Report and Order  CC Docket No.96-98, 95-185, 11 FCC Red 15499, 15616-775. 
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competition. To implement unbundling to the network elements, the section 251[d] stated that 
the commission should determine “minimum” conditions of available network. 
In Section 251[d](2), 
 
 [A]ccess to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is 
necessary. 
 [T]he failure to provide access to such network elements would impair the 
ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the 
services that it seeks to offer. 
 
FCC announced the notice of proposed rulemaking, NPRM, reviewed triennially in December 
2001,  
 
 [T]o analyze key issues for establishing general design of unbundling 
rule  
 [T]o preclude impairment 
 [T]o encourage competition 
 [T]o ensure what elements are “necessary”. 
 
Sappington (2003) showed that appropriate requirements might be different through consumer 
types. And he also insisted that obligations might make the incumbent defensive so as to “limit 
or delay” access for not only competitors but also customers.  
In the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FNPRM, issued in 2003, the 
interpretation of section 252 that was about procedure for negotiation, the arbitration and the 
approval introduced the “all-or-nothing” rule that the agreement reached was adopted in all rates 
and terms and conditions instead of the “pick-and-chose rule” in 47 CFR 51.809. The pick-and-
chose rule requested that the provision agreements are applicable to other carriers under the 
section 252 by the agreements approved by the commission16. 
Responding in a manner of court decision called USTAⅡ17, the commission was still 
under discussion on unbundling rule to clarify the existence of the impairments. The section 
251[d](2) clarified the barriers to achieve sustainable competition. Specifically, the commission 
16 FCC. Second Report and Order. FCC 04-164, July. 
17 Department of Justice. 2004. United States Court Appeals. No. 00-1012, March 2. 
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showed a twelve-month plan with two phases. It is important to note that the plan was for the 
incumbent consumers, not for new consumers18. 
First phase ordered LECs to keep providing unbundled access in a manner of status quo 
as interim response under the same rates, terms and conditions until Federal Register published 
about the obligations or final unbundling rule adopts. Therefore, for fear of a disruption or a 
confusion caused by implementing short-term interim approach, the commission tried to keep 
the status even though the interim rule seemed equal to do nothing at all with unbundling. 
Second phase ordered that the network elements must be available in any case in pursuit 
of section 251 [c](3). To achieve the goal, the commission requested LECs to lease a network 
element at more than a rate that one dollar is added to the rate on June 15, 2004. If the state 
utility commission created a rate under a certain condition, the commission requested a rate set 
by the state commission plus one dollar under the condition. 
The state commission also required loop and transport to be leased at more than 115% 
of the rate, and the requesting carriers paid for these elements on June 15, 2004, or a rate set by 
the state commission. Though they ordered the rate, the state commission allowed negotiations 
of agreements between carriers in pursuit of better rules during the transition period set by this 
plan. 
Through a policy issue of unbundling, a question still remains as Sappington (2003) and 
Economides (2003) suggested. The question is whether considerations of unbundling policy are 
enough to promote competition against structural monopoly power not only in the local loop 
market but also telecommunications industry as a whole. For example as Sappington showed, 
ILECs are structurally vertically integrated. This means that the ILECs can provide not only 
wholesale but also retail. 
The cross-subsidization may cause a boundary to encourage competition and be not 
working effectively even implementing unbundling obligations described above. We reassure 
that firms’ behavior would have an important role for further competition in the market. The 
room allowed by the legislation to negotiate between operators might be troublesome because 
their stakes might be the relation of trade-off as explained in the reaction functions.  
 In March 2010, a National Broadband Plan 19  was released and it ensured that all 
Americans can access to the broadband at affordable price. In February 2011, the FCC was 
released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that supports the plan to improve the reliability of 
the universal service.  FCC adopted principles to ensure the availability and reasonable rates for 
the services. 
18 FCC (2004), Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 04-179, August. 
19 FCC (2010), The National Broadband Plan, March. 
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2.3.3 Local Loop Unbundling: the OECD Countries 
 
Based on this consideration and practices in the US, OECD discussed general 
consideration of local loop unbundling for the purpose of introducing competition into the 
member countries so that the traditionally regulated telecommunications industry becomes fair 
and non-discriminatory market structurally. The examination of OECD issued on Sep 10, 
200320, considered possible options in three alternatives of unbundling: full unbundling, line 
sharing, and bit stream access. 
The full unbundling is an option that entrants can control lines leased from incumbent 
firm and offer full range of services including voice service. But the ownership of the 
unbundled loop is still held by incumbent and, therefore, the responsibility of maintenance is 
under the incumbent. This type of unbundling seems a desirable way of implementing process, 
but the history of traditionally facilities-based telecommunications industry in the US showed 
the considerable difficulties such as monopolistic structure and cross subsidizing.  
The line sharing is a possible option that entrants are leased some part of spectrum from 
incumbent to provide services to the subscribers. This type implies that not only the ownership 
of loop but also the provision of voice service is offered by the incumbent. A benefit of this 
option is that the entrants are not necessary to invest in facilities. However, a technical problem 
so called cross talk might become serious because the adjacency of wirelines may cause noises 
between high-speed data transfer and voice services as the network expands. This problem is 
inevitable as long as carriers share wirelines and lots of services are offered through the 
wirelines. 
The bit stream access is an option that incumbent owns and control wirelines and 
allocate spectrum to access, which access services that entrants offer rely on the designation of 
incumbent, and the services are relatively not competitive enough unlike other options. In this 
option, the incumbents still have great power to influence entrants. Implementing this type of 
unbundling is expected to be less competitive than other options. 
Through the examination of these types, the difficulty of implementing local loop 
unbundling is to motivate incumbent firms to implement the unbundling even the incumbents 
could offer competitive services to eliminate entrants. The examination of OECD insisted that 
two ways of the collocation, “caged collocation” and “co-mingling”, is an important step for 
implementing the unbundling. 
20 OECD. 2003 Developments in Local Loop Unbundling. September, Working Party on 
Telecommunication and Information Services Policies. 
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The difference between the caged collocation and the co-mingling is how they offer the 
unbundling. While the caged collocation separates the equipment of the entrants and the 
incumbents physically, the co-mingling exists altogether in the equipment. This implies that 
considering the type of collocation becomes also a step for eliminating structural barriers. 
In the examination issued on November 3, 200321, not only structural separation, OECD 
proposed other three structural approaches for considering behavioral aspect: LoopCo approach, 
Netco approach, and ADCo approach. LoopCo approach is a way that access assets and services 
are run by the established new company called LoopCo, and the rest, non-access assets and 
services, is provided by incumbent firm. Secondly, the NetCo approach is to separate into two 
companies; access network company and non-access network company. Finally the ADCo 
approach is to own loops like club or joint ownership. 
There are some questions left whether these approaches are effective and applicable to 
regulatory framework. The structural separation that OECD proposed could not solve the 
uncertainty so that the separation becomes an incentive to introduce more competition into the 
local loop market for now. 
 
2.3.4 Remarks 
 
This section reviewed the movement toward local loop unbundling. However, as the 
history showed, the incumbent’s defensive attitude against entrants is inevitable. Indeed, 
behavioral barriers are difficult to capture and deal with each case in practice. 
The complexity of behavioral barriers makes us difficult to solve all the problems we 
face. To get rid of practical problems, considering the essential traits in this chapter is of great 
importance for figuring out influential factors for the market. 
The consideration of the local loop unbundling showed that the room allowed by the 
legislation to negotiate between operators also could not solve the problems. Next chapters 
figure out and examine influential factors in recent practices, and show how those factors affect 
price and other influential factors as an incentive. 
 
 
 
 
 
21 See OECD (2003) “Benefits and Costs of Structural Separation of the Local Loop”, Working Party on 
Telecommunication and Information Services Policies, November. 
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3 The Incentive of Recent Practices in Telecommunications 
 
This chapter examines the existence of the incentive through factors in empirical data. 
We consider every possible factors related to the retail price and build a model. The model can 
estimate the influence to the price and show not only the existence of the incentive in practice 
and also show how those factors influence to the price indirectly. 
The model in this chapter considers the ARPU (Average Revenue per Unit) as the retail 
price because the ARPU can be taken as an actual payment of homogenous customers. We 
assume that all those factors are directly unobservable and its effects are included in the price. 
In practice, we pay almost the same amount of money regardless of the use of data 
traffic, or the one of the install base or the one of newer customers. Recent telecommunications 
technologies change rapidly. The data traffic on the Internet increases exponentially every year. 
So we evaluate price factors that might affect the ARPU or the payment in reality. The 
discussion here is taking a stab to figure out what would affect to our payments in the factors we 
can think of, using empirical methodology. 
Now we turn to consider the methodology used in section 3.1. It is not possible to figure 
out how possible factors affect the price implicitly or directly. It is important that, in reality, the 
factors are not necessarily pecuniary, but seem to affect the price. Therefore, empirical analysis 
can answer and contribute to analyze the indirect effects. 
 
3.1 Background 
 
As for practices in the market, we consider the year(s) contracts with the early 
termination fee as incentive compatible debt contracts22. And we assume that the fee is also 
highly related to the effort to cooperate to the contract conditions in practice by the early 
literature of the incentive compatible contracts. The incentive compatible contracts that we 
imply that the year(s) term could be highly related to the monthly payment.  Therefore, we 
suggest that there is a possible mechanism in the contracts of this kind and are certain 
conditions for the optimal contract. 
To include qualitative aspects in competition, an incentive should be observed and its 
criteria (parameters) for efficiency could be critical to analyze. In view of economics, 
22 Incentive-compatible contracts are based on Campbell (2006); Green and Laffont (1992). Limited 
liability are largely based on Sappington (1983); Harris and Raviv (1979); Poblete and Spulber (2012).  
They discussed conditions of optimal incentive for efficiency under the debt style contract and shows 
characteristics of incentive and its perspectives. The concept of early literature is inspired by the 
insurance contracts. 
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“(Q)ualitative policy refers, in our terminology, to changing details of social 
organization rather than foundations… Changes in social organization, even if they 
refer to less important aspects only, will, as a rule, be less frequent than quantitative 
changes in the value of existing instruments of economic policy”, Tinbergen (1964). 
 
In the quantitative world, i.e. in neoclassical economics, discussions are not simply the matter of 
equality between price and marginal cost in virtue of efficiency.  
Through the experiences shown in chapter 2, the market introduced competition and 
becomes more competitive, and now faces severe competitive circumstances. Due to severe 
competition, telecom operators changed charging schemes to increase revenues.  
Furthermore, they introduced differentiated services to meet individual demand. This 
means that services include many factors enabling differentiation. It is hard to explain or justify 
the pricing of differentiated services by considering only price and quantity. This is why it is 
necessary to also take quality into consideration. 
To rationale the legitimacy of the practices of this kind, results of this thesis will 
contribute to real practices of the year(s) contracts implemented by telecom operators. For 
regulatory agency, oversight of the level of the early termination fee could be a benchmark for 
not only payment (retail price) level, but also the level of the fee set by the practices and that of 
the cooperation level that would also suggest that the state of fair odds conditions between 
contractors and non-contractors except the price customers pay.  
 
3.2 The Model  
 
This subsection considers further on the possible factors taking from business practices 
cost us or differentiate us to be served. 
Recent contractual practices in the market tend to set some constraints on customers’ 
use; the amount of data transferred, the type of data, and/or the duration of our communication. 
These factors ought to affect the price we pay as the payment. 
So the primary purpose of the estimation or benchmarking here should be the one to 
estimate the indirect influences of the factors to the price in the contractual practices. There are 
two points to ensure; 
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 [S]howing a certain rationality in the dependent variables selected 
 [E]valuating the relative influences between the factors selected. 
 
The empirical data used here are from financial data of annual reports. The financial 
data are obtained by major mobile telecom operators in Japan; NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, Softbank, 
and EMOBILE numbered and classified in the index. We obtained the annual reports as many 
as possible as long as we can track the recent market status of four major players. As a result, 
we obtained the annual reports from 2004 to 2011. The data of the TCA (Telecommunications 
Carriers Association) supports those data.  
In the data, the data of “revenuesales” shows the operating revenues in the financial 
data of their annual report, and the revenues include the sales of handsets or that of other sales. 
The simple regression model to estimate the influence of the factors is defined as  
 
𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖yrcontract + ε  
(2.31) 
 
and the independent variables are defined as follows, 
 
data ARPU: data Average Revenue per User 
equipment:  Investments to the Equipment 
revenuesales:   Operating Sales 
datacap:  Dummy for the Existence of the Data Cap  
yrcontract:  Dummy for the Existence of the Contract Term. 
 
The amount of investments to the equipment is assumed that the amount of money affects the 
data ARPU because of the increase in costs. This might be straightforward when we recall 
chapter 2.  The operating sales is assumed to get the financial situation better by the increase in 
the revenues, and consequently decline the ARPU. On the data cap, the data cap is the cap that 
the upper threshold of the amount of data used is set in the contract. We assume that the 
existence of the cap tends to increase the ARPU because of, or for fear of, an additional cost for 
exceeding the limit. The existence of the year(s) term is the condition that customers should 
continue using the service during the promised term in the contract. The last two factors listed in 
the model are set as dummies. The dummies are to set to estimate the influences of the existence 
of the two practices to the retail price and other factors. 
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In the model, it is natural to use the data of the operating revenues, considering 
historical backgrounds as discussed in the earlier chapters. Indeed, considering and handling the 
relationship between the ARPU and the operating revenues seem to be meaningless in business, 
but our statistical approach here can estimate the interrelationship between those factors that 
affect indirectly. 
The model could be effective to consider the actual or real ARPU that includes the 
factors affecting to some degree. First of all, the nominal data of the ARPU is simply calculated 
from the operating revenue, but the data of the ARPU is actually interrelated to the qualitative 
factors in question. That is why, the setting of the model with qualitative factors does not have 
contradictions in setting itself, and the model could work effectively as a benchmark. 
 
3.3 The Estimation 
 
In the estimation we can get from the model, the correlation between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables is shown as table III-1, and there is two points to note 
here; first, the investment of the equipment showed negative against our assumption, and second, 
a correlation between the data ARPU and the term is relatively high. 
On the first point, the reason can be explained in a practical sense because the value of 
the unit data (packets) could decline as the capacity of the network increases. Therefore, when 
we assume the amount of data used is constant, we can show a possibility that the ARPU 
declines. 
On the second point, there is a possibility of multicollinearity. But high correlation does 
not necessarily mean multicollinearity. Therefore, a high correlation is a necessary condition for 
the existence, but not necessarily a sufficient condition. For example, neither earlier literature 
nor textbooks on Econometrics shows that showing the characteristics of multicollinearity does 
not necessarily means the denial of the validity of the analysis or the model23.  
The multicollinearity exists at the only time when an analysis is impossible. As long as 
the analysis is possible, the result and its estimation have a certain level of reliability in the 
analysis. If we deny an analysis because of high correlation, some important analyses in 
Economics are unanalyzable and unreliable because of it24. 
23 Goldberger (1968b, pp.80), quoting the definition of Johnson (1963), showed that the problem of multicollinearity 
is a matter of degree, but not an all-or nothing Problem.  
24 For example, referred by Farrar and Glauber (1967) and attempted by Goldberg (1968a), there is an analysis of 
Cobb-Douglas function. Kennedy [2008 pp.196] stated that, in the Cobb-Douglas production function, there is no 
concern about high correlation, and we can take a way not to do anything. 
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Examining multicollinearity, the result is shown in table III-2. Table III-2 shows 
eigenvalue, Variance Inflating Factor (VIF), control number, and the squares of multiple 
correlation of other independent variables. As shown in table III-2, considering the VIFs and the 
condition numbers are to discuss correlation between independent variables. The VIFs in the 
table III-2 are below 10, its standard, and the inverse 1/VIFs are also below 1, the standard, 
which shows the possibility of multicollinearity is low. 
And the control number indicates close to 1, which means variables of the investment of 
the equipment and the operation revenues. So, we can see good sensitive responses to a small 
change of data. 
The estimation of the pooling regression (OLS: Ordinary Least Squares) shows that the 
year(s) contract term is the only significant variable in the model. Other independent variables 
are not significant, but the sign of the variables were almost as assumed. The variable of the 
term affects significantly to the ARPU. 
By the three estimations and tests, the fixed model shows bigger changes in values, but 
the estimations and results of the fixed model are appropriate. The factor of the operating 
revenues in the fixed model shows the opposite sign as assumed. In the business practices, 
setting the year(s) term was significant, though the effect is not that great as that in the pooling 
model. Therefore, the model shows that the year(s) term affect significantly to other factors and 
the ARPU. 
 
Table III-1 Correlation 
 
dataARPU revenu~s equipi~t datacap yrcont~t 
dataARPU 1 
    
revenuesales -0.0416 1 
   
equipinves~t -0.0903 0.9167 1 
  
datacap 0.4805 -0.0760 -0.1609 1 
 
yrcontract 0.7633 0.02533 0.0487 0.3327 1 
 
Table III-2 the Examination of Multicollinearity 
Eigenval C_Number C_Index VIF 1/VIF R2_ xi, X 
1.9464 1.0000 1.0000 6.7665 0.1478 0.8522 
1.3228 1.4714 1.2130 6.5686 0.1522 0.8478 
0.6533 2.9795 1.7261 1.2201 0.8196 0.1804 
0.0775 25.1276 5.0127 1.1549 0.8659 0.1341 
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Table III-3 the Estimation of the Pooling Regression (OLS) 
 SS df MS  Number of 
obs 
25 
Model 3872479.34 4 968119.853  F(  4,    24) 10.37 
Residual 1867104.66 20 933355.2331  Prob > F 0.0001 
     R-squared 0.6747 
Total 5739584 24 239149.333  Adj R-
squared 
0.6096 
     Root MSE 305.54 
       
dataARPU Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
equipinves~t 0.728167 0.0562525 1.29 0.210 -0.044524 0.1901574 
revenuesales -0.0129022 0.010921 -1.45 0.163 -0.0384028 0.0069588 
datacap 351.8581 248.8079 1.41 0.173 -167.1461 870.8623 
yrcontract 685.0905 132.2963 5.18 0 409.1252 961.0557 
_cons 1903.351 160.8135 11.84 0 1567.9 2237.802 
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Table III-4 the Estimation of the Fixed Effect Model 
Fixed-effects (within) regression  Number of obs  = 25 
Group variable: id   Number of groups  = 4 
      
R-sq: within  = 0.6617   Obs per group: min = 2 
between =  0.076   avg = 6.3 
overall =  0.3465   max = 8 
      
    F(4,17)  = 8.31 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0458   Prob > F  = 0.0007 
       
dataARPU Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
equipinves~t 0.0080749 0.0551885 0.15 0.885 -0.1083627 0.1245126 
revenuesales 0.0099478 0.019692 0.51 0.62 -0.0315987 0.0514944 
datacap 69.00008 171.9779 0.4 0.693 -293.8415 431.8416 
yrcontract 475.1588 89.27734 5.32 0 286.8 663.5175 
_cons 1522.026 518.5658 2.94 0.009 427.9478 2616.104 
       
sigma_u 654.07226      
sigma_e 187.92701      
rho 0.92374326 (fraction of variance due to u_i)   
       
F test that all u_i=0 F(3, 17) =    11.96 Prob > F = 0.0002  
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Table III-5 the Estimation of the Random Effect Model 
Random-effects GLS regression  
Group variable:  id Number of obs = 25 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6097  Obs per group: min = 2 
between = 0.986  avg = 6.3 
overall = 0.6747  max = 8 
 
 Wald chi2(4)   = 41.48 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)  Prob > chi2  = 0 
 
dataARPU Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
equipinves~t 0.0728167 0.0562525 1.29 0.196 -0.0374362 0.1830696 
revenuesales -0.015822 0.010921 -1.45 0.147 -0.0372268 0.0055827 
datacap 351.8581 248.8079 1.41 0.157 -135.7964 839.5127 
yrcontract 685.0905 132.2963 5.18 0 425.7945 944.3864 
_cons 1903.351 160.8135 11.84 0 1588.162 2218.539 
 
sigma_u 0  
sigma_e 187.92701  
rho 0 (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Table III-6   Hausman Test 
---- Coefficients ----  
 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 fixed . Difference S.E 
equipinves~t 0.0080749 0.072167 -0.0647418 . 
revenuesales 0.0099478 -0.015822 0.0257699 0.0163862 
datacap 69.00008 351.8581 -282.858 . 
yrcontract 475.1588 685.0905 -209.9317 . 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
=       34.99 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
Table III-7   Breusch and Pagan Test 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
 
dataARPU[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] 
 
Estimated results:  
  Var sd = sqrt(Var) 
 dataARPU 239149.3 489.029 
 e 35316.56 187.927 
 u 0 0 
 
Test:   Var(u) = 0  
 chibar2(01) =     0.00 
 Prob > chibar2 =   1.0000 
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3.4 Remarks 
 
This section considered actual retail price in the case of Japan. The model in section 3.2 
showed that available empirical data defined as the factors that affect the retail price indirectly. 
We can conversely say that the factors not recognizable as a cost or a part of the retail price 
affect the retail price can be observable its influence to a statistically significant degree. 
The estimations show that the existence of the year(s) term was the only significant 
result that affect ARPU significantly. So we can see that the factors of the practices tend to 
increase costs and ARPU. This implies that the more discriminations are introduced in business 
practices or in the contract or service plans, this result shows that those factors affect costs 
significantly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
March 2014 
 
 
 
4. Bit/Data Cap 
 
The bit/data cap is a conventional way to limit data use and avoid data traffic 
congestion. A decision on the amount of data might be an arbitrary managerial decision. In 
virtue of competition, business practices are rarely discussed in the name of freedom of 
management under competition. This article focuses on the effect of the practice. 
We consider the effects of a practice implemented worldwide in the 
telecommunications industry. The practice sets a “cap”, a quantitative limit on data use, and 
charges additionally when customers use more than the limit set by operators. 
Next we examine the validity of the cap through analysis of empirical data of fixed 
telephone services under the models, and propose a bridge over the problem in mobile services. 
The practice of the cap has been implemented over the years in fixed line telecom services, but 
the practice has been widely implemented recently in the mobile market as the broadband 
diffuses in the fixed network with a flat-rate charging scheme. Therefore, the models in this 
chapter examine factors that affect the cap. The models also consider not only the effect of each 
factor, but also policy issues so that the practice in question can be supervised by the agency. In 
short, how a cap can be set and rationalized is examined. 
Recently, telecom operators have implemented or attempted to implement bit/data caps 
on telecom data services. The practices are implemented in a process covering enough network 
capacity or geographical area to provide data services. A concern we point out here is the one 
when all operators implement the practice uniformly. We also point out that a certain degree of 
uniform practice could be rational even though the practice tends to be justified in virtue of 
freedom of business management. 
In section 4.1, we review the background of some aspects, especially the 
methodological background. Section 4.2 explores the models for the bit/data cap. Section 4.3 
examines basic statistics and estimations. Section 4.4 considers the newer data and examines its 
estimations. Section 4.5 concludes the analysis and points out some future extensions. 
 
4.1 The Data  
 
To obtain qualitative data, empirical data in this article are based on OECD data which 
include detailed data on the cap and periodic data in OECD Communications Outlook. To 
discuss the characteristics and effects of the cap per se, this chapter focuses on a static model 
and data. The empirical data cover the most recent data available on the amount of the bit/data 
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cap, downlink and uplink access speed, and minutes to the cap, monthly payments (USDPPP), 
and price per Mbits/s (USDPPP)25. These factors as variables are almost all available from the 
data source that might be related to the cap. The data cover all service plans offered in OECD 
member countries that have the bit/data cap. 
This chapter shows possible empirical contributions to the incentive using observed 
data. If the competition needs the bit/data cap, the scheme or model should be simple and easy 
to capture without observing and listing lots of data and variables. To achieve this goal, 
assumptions and settings should be carefully defined. These normative considerations are 
considered in next section. 
Table IV-1 shows correlations of the variables in the data.  Some relationships indicate 
relatively high numbers as shown; between downlink speed and Monthly payment, between 
downlink and the cap, and between monthly payment and the cap. This suggests that the bit/data 
cap tends to affect downlink speed and monthly payments. 
 
Table IV-1: Correlation of Variables 
 Downkb~s Upkbit
s 
Minute~p USDpri~P PMBIT~P BitcapMB 
Downkbits 1.0000      
Upkbits 0.1763 1.0000     
Minutestor~p -0.2627 -0.1234 1.0000    
USDpricemo~P 0.4176 0.0023 -0.0402 1.0000   
PMBITUSDPP
P 
-0.3912 -0.1552 0.3501 0.0047 1.0000  
BitcapMB 0.4310 0.0234 0.3229 0.4456 -0.1968 1.0000 
 
Source: OECD Communications Outlook 2011 & OECD Broadband Statistics Sep., 2010 
  
Table IV-2 shows sample statistics of the data used in this article. The basic statistics 
shows that downlink speed under data cap is about 24Mbits/s, and other variables show that 
operators in the status quo tend to set lower than standard deviation level. This indicates that 
customers in status quo using data cap plan use lower level in quality of service.  This result 
shows the need to improve the circumstances of customers using bit/data cap plan. 
25 All data used are shown in the Appendix. The measure of value is in USDPPP for consistency of the 
data. 
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Table IV-2:  Basic Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Downkbits 185 23345.14 24617.64 512 102400 
Upkbits 185 5001.342 10584.42 0 50000 
Minutestor~p 185 875.689 1624.719 8.888889 9333.333 
USDpricemo~P 185 47.54448 23.48875 0 145.8096 
PMBITUSDPPP 185 7.028039 11.90895 0 66.36744 
BitcapMB 185 73194.59 89970.25 1000 500000 
 
Source: OECD Communications Outlook 2011 & OECD Broadband Statistics Sep., 2010 
 
4.2 The Model 
 
4.2.1 The Normative Assumptions 
 
For empirical analyses, it is important to describe how we define the characteristics of 
the cap and market in question. The actual management in the market is not adjustable in real 
time. This means that management has some “slackness”. The discussions of the slackness26 
were treated as an efficiency measure. Berg and Jeong (1991) considered the effectiveness of 
slackness using probit model, and Abel-khalik, (1988) discussed the setting of a target threshold.  
As Villas-Boas (2009) implemented a concept of differentiation in empirical analysis, 
the decisions may differ according to their preferences. Furthermore, we consider a model 
setting the mean value as the threshold in subsection 4.2.3 27. Unlike earlier literature, we 
introduce the value of the standard deviation, or the ones derived from basic statistics, as the 
threshold. 
To evaluate these complicated services in broader terms, we need to have a certain 
standard and consider possible options. Therefore, the objective of the agency is to assess 
competitive circumstances in a qualitatively highly differentiated market.  
The following background shows that the standard we expected is statistically testable 
using empirical data. The background for the methodology is based heavily on an article 
(Bouissou, Laffont, and Vuong, BLV, 1986), which considers log-likelihood ratio test for 
26 Selten (1986); Abel-khalik (1988); Berg and Jeong (1991). 
27 The model is based on Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). 
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noncausality; noncausality is the abstract or theoretical concept of stochastic process of quality. 
The definition of noncausality by BLV is as follows, 
 
“(I)f X, Y are two stochastic processes, then Y does not cause X at any instant.” 
 
In this definition, X involves an infinite number of random variables¸ so conditions need 
to be set to reduce independence properties of a finite set of variables. BLV defined the 
probability distribution such that Y does not cause X if qualitative data are available. The two 
stochastic processes in BLV are set in time, past and future, but this chapter sets it in relation to 
a certain threshold of the variable we discuss, under or over a bit/data cap. As BLV sets the 
value of X as null when the time is before a certain defined period of time, we set the value of 
the cap as null when the cap is over a certain defined threshold.  The probability model 
estimates a stationary process, which identifies the independent restriction, the threshold, to be 
defined. Details of the model are discussed in section 4.2.3. 
 
4.2.2 The Simple OLS Model 
 
To describe bit/data cap in practice, we build a model of how charges and speeds affect 
the amount of the cap. We consider a simple mechanism to build a regulatory tool to capture the 
characteristics of the practice, and obtain better network services, which do not restrict operators’ 
behaviors. The simple OLS model is as follows; 
                    𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑅𝑅                   (4.1) 
 
where 
 
DC : Data Cap (MB) 
DL : Downlink Speed (kbits/s) 
UP : Uplink Speed (kbits/s) 
MIN : Minutes to reach the bit/data cap (min.) 
MON : Monthly payment (USDPPP) 
PMBIT : Price per Mbit/s (USDPPP). 
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Under those conditions, we can hypothetically estimate the quality or market 
mechanism we faced as we had been discussed. The analysis in this chapter through the model 
is highly expected that the qualitative factors relate to the price. We estimate through this 
empirical tools under the competitive circumstances. The estimations in this chapter show the 
influences of qualitative factors to the market. 
  
4.2.3. The Basic Logit and Probit Models 
 
To consider the cap and its incentive in the service plans, a certain amount of the cap is 
already determined. In statistical view, we consider the case where the agency sets the amount 
of the cap level at the mean level, MEAN, and the standard deviation level, STDDEV, obtained 
from statistical data. 
Following the theoretical background in section 2, we set DC as a latent variable and 
assume 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶∗ = 1 if DC becomes more than the standard deviation level, and 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶∗ = 0 if DC is 
less than the level, shown as follows; 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 > 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀, 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉 ⇔ 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇 + 𝑅𝑅 > 0 
⟺ 𝑅𝑅 > −𝛼𝛼0 − 𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 − 𝛼𝛼2𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 − 𝛼𝛼3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝛼𝛼4𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 − 𝛼𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇 
 
To obtain 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶∗ = 1, we assume its probability,  𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶∗ = 1),  
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶∗ = 1) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 > 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉)= 𝑃𝑃(𝑅𝑅 > −𝛼𝛼0 − 𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 − 𝛼𝛼2𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 − 𝛼𝛼3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝛼𝛼4𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 − 𝛼𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇)= 1 − 𝐹𝐹(−𝛼𝛼0 − 𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 − 𝛼𝛼2𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 − 𝛼𝛼3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝛼𝛼4𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 − 𝛼𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇)              (4.2) 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶∗ = 0) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉)= 𝑃𝑃(𝑅𝑅 ≤ −𝛼𝛼0 − 𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 − 𝛼𝛼2𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 − 𝛼𝛼3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝛼𝛼4𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 − 𝛼𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇)= 𝐹𝐹(−𝛼𝛼0 − 𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 − 𝛼𝛼2𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 − 𝛼𝛼3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝛼𝛼4𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 − 𝛼𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇)                      (4.3) 
 
where F(•) is the cumulative distribution function. Additional variables are considered in the 
models 2 and 3 that include interaction terms discussed later. Next subsection also considers the 
status quo at other levels of the cap; 2GB and 5GB. Those levels set instead of STDDEV in the 
models are popular in the US mobile market. 
 
59 
 
 
 
4.3 The Estimations and Results 
 
The estimations and results of the OLS models are shown in table IV-3. The interaction 
terms work effectively to increase fits in the OLS models. The simplest OLS model listed as 
model 1 shows a certain fit, the rate of adjusted R-squared being 0.4886, and some interesting 
results.  
Coefficients of the monthly payment and the Price per Mbits/s (PMBIT) show that 
those variables are highly related, but the opposite direction. This means that a unit change in 
the monthly payment tends to set about 1.3GB higher cap. In case of charging higher PMBIT, it 
shows vice versa, setting the cap about 1.9GB lower as the PMBIT increases. The result of the 
PMBIT shows that a network built by a reckless investment causes higher price and less amount 
of the cap, which the same result is shown by the Bental and Spigel (1995). The variable MIN 
shows that the cap increases about 28MB when it takes one minute more to reach the cap. 
Tables from IV-4 to IV-7 show the estimation using the logit and the probit model. As 
assumptions and settings shown in the former subsection, we discuss the level of the cap, and 
examine statistically for its validity. As shown in previous subsections, we choose a level of the 
cap from possible thresholds to observe the status quo of the market. The estimations of the 
logit models set zero as the threshold of DC for normalization.  
The result shows the uplink speed can never obtain a significant result in any OLS 
models. The uplink speed can be explained in the following models. In the logit models, we 
obtain better significance and different characteristics than we expected intuitively.  
For further analysis, we create models that have some dummy variables and some 
interaction variables. The models with those variables are estimated better fits and results shown 
in table IV-3. 
The estimations at the mean level show better estimations and results than those of the 
OLS. The PMBIT shows the same result as that of the OLS, which the cap is highly influenced 
negatively by the variables.  
The logit model can estimate the marginal effect of the variables. The result of the 
marginal effect also shows that the PMBIT is the only variable that works negatively. 
The probit model, a non-linear estimation, shows that the PMBIT is more sensitive than 
that in the logit model. This is caused by the distribution and density of the data set. The effect 
of those terms were discussed and assumed in the models in earlier chapters. In that sense, the 
difference is acknowledgeable theoretically. 
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The amount of the cap at the mean level is almost the same amount as Japanese mobile 
operators set as the upper threshold. At the mean level, the impact on the PMBIT are relatively 
higher than any other levels.  
The following results in the model at the 5GB level shows that the impact of the 
PMBIT are relatively low. The cap at the 5GB is the major upper limit in the US mobile 
operators, 2GB for middle range customers. 
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Table IV-3:  Estimations of the OLS Model 
  model1 model2 model3 
  b/t b/t b/t 
Downkbits 1.215154 0.0531381 0.0310458 
 [25.0697716]*** [2.221978] [2.13327515] 
Upkbits -0.0988446 -0.3700466 -0.0134667 
 [1.7846193] [.93923229] [1.9607111] 
Minutestoreachbitcap 28.17814 18.29583 16.5731 
 [28.9282208]*** [25.8860771]*** [25.2363149]*** 
USDpricemonthlyPPP 1258.117 413.2687 452.3545 
 [25.5337969]*** [22.2004718]** [22.478916]** 
PMBITUSDPPP -1874.855 -1350.286 -1355.917 
 [-2.0794472]*** [-1.5308452]*** [-1.63535]*** 
dum_mean  38480.74  
  [22.7182777]***  
dwnxmean  2.015292  
  [26.0693785]***  
dum_dev   49404.63 
   [23.3170296]*** 
dwn_dev   1.874077 
   [25.6168658]*** 
_cons -25994.26 11348.91 11885.31 
 [-.21099247]** [21.1461199] [21.2220056] 
R-squared 0.5025224 0.7184221 0.7266587 
Adj-R-squared 0.4886263 0.7072863 0.7158486 
N 185 185 185 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table IV-4:  The Estimation of the Logit Model under the Cap at the Mean Level 
Logistic regression   Number of obs = 185 
    LR chi2(5) = 190.92 
    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -25.073447   Pseudo R2 = 0.7920 
       
dum_mean Coef. Std. Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Downkbits 0.0000216 0.000015 1.43 0.152 -7.92e-06 0.000051 
Upkbits 0.0000647 0.0000271 2.39 0.017 0.0000115 0.000118 
Minutestor~p 0.0135733 0.0028508 4.76 0.000 0.0079858 0.019161 
USDpricemo~P 0.1143613 0.0310127 3.69 0.000 0.0535776 0.175145 
PMBITUSDPPP -1.528423 0.3219924 -4.75 0.000 -2.159517 -0.89733 
_cons -9.780121 2.206768 -4.43 0.000 -14.10531 -5.45494 
       
Note: 19 failures and 13 successes completely determined. 
 
 
Average marginal effects  Number of obs  =  185 
Model VCE :  OIM   
 
Expression : Pr(dum_mean), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. :  Downkbits Upkbits Minutestoreachbitcap USDpricemonthlyPPP 
  PMBITUSDPPP 
 
  Delta-method     
 dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Downkbits 8.71E-07 5.88E-07 1.48 0.139 -2.82E-07 2.02E-06 
Upkbits 2.61E-06 9.82E-07 2.66 0.008 6.90E-07 4.54E-06 
Minutestor~p 0.0005488 0.0000477 11.5 0 0.0004552 0.000642 
USDpricemo~P 0.0046237 0.0009148 5.05 0 0.0028308 0.006417 
PMBITUSDPPP -0.061795 0.0052408 -11.79 0 -0.072067 -0.05152 
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Table IV-5: The Estimation of the Probit Model under the Cap at the Mean Level 
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects  Number of obs = 185 
  LR chi2(5)    = 190.69 
Prob > chi2   = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -25.18553 Pseudo R2     = 0.7910 
 
dum_mean dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [    95% C.I.   ] 
Downkb~s 2.08e-06 1.69e-06 1.49 0.137 23345.1 -1.2e-06 5.40e-06 
Upkbits 5.25e-06 2.49e-06 2.73 0.006 5001.34 3.70E-07 0.00001 
Minute~p 0.0012037 0.0005454 5.32 0.000 875.689 0.000135 0.002273 
USDpri~P 0.0105157 0.00429 3.84 0.000 47.5445 0.002107 0.018924 
PMBIT~P -0.135994 0.0555324 -5.31 0.000 7.02804 -0.244835 -0.027152 
  
obs. P 0.3567568  
pred. P 0.0907514 (at x-bar) 
 
    z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
 
 
Table IV-6: The Estimation of the Logit Model under the Cap at the STD Dev. Level 
Logistic regression  Number of obs   = 185 
 LR chi2(5)      = 173.72 
Prob > chi2     = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -27.39397  Pseudo R2       = 0.7602 
 
dum_dev Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Downkbits 0.0000332 0.0000158 2.09 0.036 2.12E-06 6.42e-05 
Upkbits 0.0000408 0.0000247 1.65 0.099 -7.69E-06 8.93e-05 
Minutestor~p 0.0102574 0.0021649 4.74 0.000 0.0060142 0.0145005 
USDpricemo~P 0.0982766 0.0270122 3.64 0.000 0.0453337 0.1512195 
PMBITUSDPPP -1.169159 0.2923528 -4.00 0.000 -1.74216 -0.5961576 
_cons -9.631862 2.147876 -4.48 0.000 -13.84162 -5.422102 
 
Note: 16 failures and 13 successes completely determined. 
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Average marginal effects                           Number of obs = 185 
Model VCE  :  OIM  
 
Expression   : Pr(dum_dev), predict()  
dy/dx w.r.t. : Downkbits Upkbits Minutestoreachbitcap USDpricemonthlyPPP 
 PMBITUSDPPP 
 
  Delta-method     
Downkbits dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Upkbits 1.50e-06 6.57e-07 2.28 0.023 2.11e-07 2.79e-06 
Minutestor~p 1.84e-06 1.06e-06 1.73 0.083 -2.40e-07 3.93e-06 
USDpricemo~P 0.0004638 0.000036 12.88 0.000 0.0003932 0.0005343 
PMBITUSDPPP 0.0044433 0.0008858 5.02 0.000 0.0027072 0.0061794 
_cons -0.0528604 0.008362 -6.32 0.000 -.0692497 -0.0364711 
 
 
Table IV-7: The Estimation of the Probit Model under the Cap at the STD Dev. Level 
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects  Number of obs = 185 
 
 
LR chi2(5)    = 174.56 
Prob > chi2   = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -26.969908  Pseudo R2     = 0.7639 
 
dum_dev dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [    95% C.I.   ] 
Downkb~s 1.49e-06 1.42e-06 2.27 0.023 23345.1 -1.30e-06 4.30e-06 
Upkbits 2.03e-06 1.57e-06 2.10 0.036 5001.34 -1.0e-06 5.10e-06 
Minute~p 0.000433 0.0003423 5.09 0.000 875.689 -0.000238 0.001104 
USDpri~P 0.004264 0.0031684 3.80 0.000 47.5445 -0.001946 0.010474 
PMBIT~P -0.04874 0.034424 -4.62 0.000 7.02804 -0.11621 0.01873 
  
obs. P 0.3081081  
pred. P 0.0333653 (at x-bar) 
 
    z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
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Table IV-8: The Estimation of the Logit Model under the Cap at 5GB Level 
Logistic regression  Number of obs   = 185 
 LR chi2(5)      = 146.26 
Prob > chi2     = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -10.492357  Pseudo R2       = 0.8745 
 
dum_5GB Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Downkbits 0.0001256 0.0000578 2.17 0.03 0.0000123 0.000239 
Upkbits 0.0001398 0.0002323 0.60 0.547 -0.000316 0.000595 
Minutestor~p 0.060894 0.0212253 2.87 0.004 0.0192932 0.1024948 
USDpricemo~P 0.1108297 0.0458752 2.42 0.016 0.020916 0.2007434 
PMBITUSDPPP -1.532688 0.5314032 -2.88 0.004 -2.57422 -0.4911573 
_cons -6.299963 2.645653 -2.38 0.017 -11.48535 -1.114578 
 
Note: 5 failures and 99 successes completely determined. 
 
 
Average marginal effects                           Number of obs =  185 
Model VCE    :  OIM   
 
Expression   : Pr(dum_5GB), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : Downkbits Upkbits Minutestoreachbitcap USDpricemonthlyPPP 
                PMBITUSDPPP 
 
  Delta-method     
 dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Downkbits 2.10E-06 7.75e-07 2.71 0.007 5.78e-07 3.62e-06 
Upkbits 2.33E-06 3.85e-06 0.61 0.544 -5.21e-06 9.88e-06 
Minutestor~p 0.0010164 0.0002192 4.64 0.000 0.0005867 0.0014461 
USDpricemo~P 0.0018499 0.0006136 3.01 0.003 0.0006472 0.0030526 
PMBITUSDPPP -.0255829 0.0053537 -4.78 0.000 -.0360759 -0.015089 
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Table IV-9: The Estimation of the Probit Model under the Cap at 5GB Level 
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects  Number of obs = 185 
 LR chi2(5)    = 146.71 
Prob > chi2   = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -10.268593  Pseudo R2     = 0.8772 
 
dum_5GB dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [    95% C.I.   ] 
Downkb~s 9.00e-147 1.90e-144 2.43 0.015 23345.1 -4.00E-144 4.00e-144 
Upkbits 8.10e-147 1.70e-144 0.51 0.607 5001.34 -3.e-144 3.00e-144 
Minute~p 4.20e-144 8.90e-142 3.09 0.002 875.689 -2.e-141 2.00e-141 
USDpri~P 8.00e-144 1.70e-141 2.56 0.011 47.5445 -3.e-141 3.00e-141 
PMBIT~P -1.10e-142 2.20e-140 -3.12 0.002 7.02804 -4.e-140 4.00e-140 
  
obs. P 0.8324324  
pred. P 1 (at x-bar) 
 
    z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
 
 
Table IV-10: The Estimation of the Logit Model under the Cap at 2GB Level 
Logistic regression Number of obs   = 185 
 LR chi2(5)      = 115.15 
Prob > chi2     = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -11.881773  Pseudo R2       = 0.8289 
 
dum_2GB Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Downkbits 0.0001448 0.0000553 2.62 0.009 0.0000365 0.0002531 
Upkbits -.0000408 0.000162 -0.25 0.801 -0.0003583 0.0002766 
Minutestor~p 0.0599045 0.0214933 2.79 0.005 0.0177784 0.1020306 
USDpricemo~P 0.145727 0.060584 2.41 0.016 0.0269846 0.2644694 
PMBITUSDPPP -.5727106 0.201523 -2.84 0.004 -0.9676884 -0.1777328 
_cons -7.287796 2.718769 -2.68 0.007 -12.61649 -1.959107 
 
Note: 0 failures and 107 successes completely determined. 
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Average marginal effects  Number of obs   = 185 
Model VCE    : OIM   
 
Expression   : Pr(dum_2GB), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : Downkbits Upkbits Minutestoreachbitcap USDpricemonthlyPPP 
 PMBITUSDPPP 
 
  Delta-method     
 dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Downkbits 2.78E-06 6.65e-07 4.18 0.000 1.47e-06 4.08e-06 
Upkbits -7.83e-07 3.09e-06 -0.25 0.800 -6.85e-06 5.28e-06 
Minutestor~p 0.0011483 0.0002915 3.94 0.000 0.0005769 0.0017198 
USDpricemo~P 0.0027935 0.0009041 3.09 0.002 0.0010215 0.0045655 
PMBITUSDPPP -.0109786 0.0026991 -4.07 0.000 -0.0162688 -0.0056884 
 
 
Table IV-11: The Estimation of the Probit Model under the Cap at 2GB Level 
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects            Number of obs =     185 
  LR chi2(5)    =  115.72 
Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
Log likelihood = -11.599215  Pseudo R2     = 0.8330 
 
 dum_2GB  dF/dx    Std. Err.       z     P>|z|      x-bar   [    95%  C.I.   ] 
Downkb~s 9.40e-192 0 2.81 0.005 23345.1 9.00e-192 9.00e-192 
 Upkbits -2.30e-192 0 -0.24 0.813 5001.34 -2.00e-192 -2.00e-192 
Minute~p 3.60e-189 0 3.17 0.002 875.689 4.00e-189 4.00e-189 
USDpri~P 9.10e-189 0 2.47 0.013 47.5445 9.00e-189 9.00e-189 
PMBIT~P -3.50e-188 0 -3.30 0.001 7.02804 -3.00e-188 -3.00e-188 
  
  obs. P 0.8756757  
 pred. P 1 (at x-bar) 
 
    z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
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Taking a recent trend especially in the mobile data market into consideration, some 
mobile operators implement a 5GB cap at its maximum for data use, and avoid congestion of 
their network. Recent strong demand for mobile data use is not a phenomenon that arose 
suddenly. Operators have emerged to bundle their services in the name of fixed and mobile 
convergence. This business strategy benefits both operators and customers, but the operators 
underestimate the demand for data use. The customers take the bundled service as a seamless 
service and expect a seamless access without limits on the place of access. Lower charges on 
each service caused by bundling seem to give an excuse for lower quality of each service.  
As shown in the tables, the marginal effect of the PMBIT at 5GB or 2GB showed about 
2.5% or 1.1% decline in the probability of setting the cap, respectively. The estimations at 5GB 
level shown in table IV-8 and IV-9 suggest that setting the cap at 5GB statistically explains 
better than the case of the cap at standard deviation level. This implies that the cap of 5GB in 
mobile market may be calculated, justified, and set by the operators. The irrationality of this 
implication is that most operators set the same amount of the cap even though the capacity, 
density, and quality of their networks are different. A 5GB cap could be justified as long as their 
services are offered by bundling, and the PMBIT would have the same level and conditions as 
those of fixed line services. 
 
4.4 The Newer Data and Its Analysis 
 
Section 4.3 considered the effect of the Bit/Data cap service plans in OECD countries. 
The latest data in the OECD changed our view. As of 2013, the latest data is the 2011 data28 
shown in Appendix B, a year later of the data used in section 4.3.  
The cap we discussed in this chapter is measured in GB scale, though the analysis here 
changed to MB scale for its consistency. This seems that the telecom market become more 
generous on the data use, but this does not necessarily mean the generosity. The factor of the 
minutes to reach the cap is no longer available. The newer data could be falsely seen that the 
operators eliminate small amount of the cap, but the analysis in this subsection shows that it is 
more difficult to see the relationships between the factors and the reason why the cap is 
implemented.  
Now we consider the correlations of the variables in the newer data shown in table IV-
12. The correlation shows some apparent change comparing to the data used in the former 
section. 
28 The newer data can be obtained from http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/BB-Portal-
ListOfBBOffers_Sep2011_Final.xls 
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First, the value of a correlation between downlink and uplink speed arises to a certain 
higher result, .6248. This result seems to be due to the improvement in overall communications 
infrastructure for broadband. 
Second, the second point is critical for this section that the variable of the cap is rarely 
correlates to the other variables. To make things worse, the variable of the Bit/Data cap is 
almost completely independent factor as far as we analyzed. Its effects are more than we can see 
in the newer data. This may be the reason why we fail to implement the model in the former 
section. In the newer dataset, almost every possible statistical methods and combinations are 
tried, but won’t work. 
The sudden change in the characteristics of the cap in the dataset is very doubtful. 
Though we focused on the data plans with the cap, it does not make sense that the 
characteristics suddenly change and there is almost no any kind of statistically significant 
relationships between any variables directly. 
Therefore, we are forced to change the model for the dataset, but we continue to figure 
out the effect of the cap in a different way. As we can see in table I-12, the correlation shows 
that the cap is now low correlation with the downlink speed, but the downlink speed now highly 
correlates to the uplink. 
Considering from the basic statistics in table IV-13, the implement of the cap seems to 
give customers better of higher quality of service by controlling data traffic, but the data of the 
basic statistics show that the plans implementing the cap are not qualitatively superior to the 
plans without it. The downlink and uplink speeds of the plans without the cap are faster, though 
the minimum monthly payment is almost the same.  
The monthly price of the plan without the cap is as four to eight times more than that 
with the cap according to the basic statistics. The comparison of the basic statistics also shows 
that the operators ask higher charge to the PMBIT though they set the cap to discourage 
customers’ data use. 
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Table IV-12 the Correlation of Variables 
 Downkb~s Upkbits USDpri~P PMBIT~P BitcapMB 
Downkbits 1.0000     
Upkbits 0.6248 1.0000    
USDpricemo~P 0.4695 0.3010 1.0000   
PMBITUSDPPP -0.2350 -0.1325 -0.1089 1.0000  
BitcapMB 0.1987 0.1399 0.1534 -0.0829 1.0000 
 
Table IV-13 The Basic Statistics of the Plans w/ the Cap 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Downkbits 161 24638.11 29825.69 256 256000 
Upkbits 160 3311.412 7300.184 128 40960 
USDpricemo~P 161 55.08035 21.87893 14.0822 120.0971 
PMBITUSDPPP 161 8.690088 22.38685 0.381315 188.8516 
BitcapMB 161 149516.8 449464.4 1000 5120000 
 
Table IV-14 the Basic Statistics of the Plans w/o the Cap 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Downkbits 457 46847.72 116205 256 1024000 
Upkbits 448 18042.55 91825.16 100 1024000 
USDpricemo~P 457 63.67947 94.87938 14.15611 1400.366 
PMBITUSDPPP 457 7.79571 16.03671 0.054144 177.7369 
 
4.4.1 The model 
 
The models in the former section consider the effectiveness of the various factors to the 
Bit/Data cap, and the data eloquently explain some tendencies. After the analysis for the newer 
data using the model in section 4.2.2, what we found was that the newer data could never be 
explained by the model in the former sections. 
So, going back to the concepts, what we can do is to figure out the relationships and the 
tendencies between factors listed in the data. In this sense, what the newer data suggests is that 
the status quo suddenly changes to the one that the cap is not the factor to be explained. 
Through this analysis, we shows the other function of the cap in the market changes.  
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Therefore, this subsection considers that the downlink speed is the factor to be 
explained. The model is expected to figure out how the various factors are related and to what 
degree each factor affect to the monthly payment. To figure out the role of the cap in the market, 
the model can be described as follows. 
                              𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑅𝑅                             (4.4) 
 
Where 
 
DC : Bit/Data Cap (MB) 
DL : Downlink Speed (kbits/s) 
UP : Uplink Speed (kbits/s) 
MON : Monthly payment (USDPPP) 
PMBIT : Price per Mbit/s (USDPPP). 
 
The model (4.4) is the basic model for section 4.4. As we stated before, the purpose of the 
analysis is still to figure out the effect of the cap though we changed the model. 
To satisfy this purpose, we use the interaction term to figure out indirect effects between 
the variables as analyzed on earlier sections in this chapter. The interaction terms are defined as 
the product of the two independent variables. The combinations of the terms are shown in the 
labels in the table IV-15. 
 
cap_up : DC*UP 
cap_mon : DC*MON 
cap_PMb : DC*PMBIT 
up_mon : UP*MON 
up_PMb : UP*PMBIT 
mon_PMb : MON*PMBIT 
 
4.4.2 The Estimations and the Results  
 
The estimation and the results are shown in table IV-15. The result shows that the 
model (4.4) could be captured the characteristics of the cap and its effects between the other 
variables. 
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The results of the model 1 shows that the direct effect of the variables are statistically 
significant except the cap. The variables except the cap can explain the downlink speed 
statistically. The estimation in the model 1 shows that the unit increase in the monthly payment 
raises the downlink speed about 397kbit/s and the PMBIT lowers the speed 174kbits/s as shown. 
The model 2 in table IV-15 is added the interaction terms regarding the cap, and the 
model fits better shown in the coefficient of determination than model 1. The estimation of the 
model 2 suggests that the cap works positively that the unit increase in the cap increases the 
downlink speed. The model 2 is the only model that can explain the direct effect of the cap 
statistically. The interaction term between the cap and monthly payment, cap_mon, works 
positively, while the same interactive term shows negative effect in the model 2. So the 
interaction term cap_PMb is the same negative effect to the downlink speed even in the model 3. 
The model 3 includes all interaction terms available, and the estimation shows a high coefficient 
of determination.  
The result of the interaction term between the cap and the uplink speed works 
negatively in the model 2, though both variables show positive effect. On the other hand in 
model 3, the result is almost the same result but the opposite sign. Both results of the cap_up 
show statistically significant. This instability and relatively small effects in this analysis seem to 
be caused by the change of the cap’s characteristics, somehow highly independent, in other 
words, highly low correlation more than the value shown in the tables in this section. 
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Table IV-15 the estimations of the OLS model 
` 
  
model1 model2 model3 
b/t b/t b/t 
Upkbits 2.086526 2.074989 8.863436 
 [8.507441]*** [7.524869]*** [8.170996]*** 
BitcapMB 0.0047735 0.0261676 0.0082138 
 [1.249298] [4.614244]*** [1.709545]* 
USDpricemonthlyPPP 397.2548 318.4273 469.5663 
 [4.8686]*** [3.810405]*** [5.539412]*** 
PMBITUSDPPP -174.9044 -26.65073 357.1205 
 [-2.291038]** [-0.4021879] [1.636908] 
cap_up  -3.06E-06 3.97E-06 
  [-4.02002]*** [2.940458]*** 
cap_mon  0.0010379 0.0007221 
  [5.898953]*** [4.64676]*** 
cap_PMb  -0.0238971 -0.0148098 
  [-8.32387]5*** [-5.888949]*** 
up_mon   -0.0758078 
   [-4.449805]*** 
up_PMb   -3.25736 
   [-9.760439]*** 
mon_PMb   0.2863846 
   [0.065076] 
_cons -3303.032 110.7287 144.0303 
 -0.6990745 0.0247364 0.0312574 
R-squared 0.5019078 0.6617021 0.8014435 
Adj-R-squared 0.4891362 0.6462244 0.7882064 
N 161 161 161 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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4.5 Remarks 
 
We considerd a case where a regulatory agency takes a qualitative incentive into 
consideration for competition. As for policymaking, a regulatory agency could use logit and 
probit models which could set a threshold of Bit/Data cap at the standard deviation level and 
5GB level derived from sample basic statistics.  
Unlike earlier studies, we applied logit and probit models to the telecommunications 
market, and modified to a 5GB threshold set by statistical result, standard deviation, and 
practical market observation. To do this, we organized empirical data available worldwide and 
considered qualitative factors. We also considered the cap-setting process taking qualitative 
factors into consideration for the price. With this view, we used the empirical methodology to 
justify thresholds actually set by operators. 
The estimations and results of this article would contribute not only to capturing 
relationships in the market with the bit/data cap we actually face, but would also give the 
regulatory agency a regulatory instrument to benchmark. The contribution also showed that this 
analysis would give some reasons for operators to rationalize thresholds they actually set. 
Through our estimations, settings of MON and PMBIT were more likely to be set by 
the capacity that could be accessed without congestion or other concerns on quality of service. 
Estimations all in chapter 4 suggested that PMBIT might be one of the effective indicator of 
bit/data cap because the variable is statistically significant. 
According to the estimations in the newer data, the bit/data cap is statistically almost 
nothing to do with any variables; the speeds, the measured price, the monthly price, or its 
interactive effect. In other words, the bit/data cap sets arbitrary. However, the down link speed 
showed high correlation between the factors, and the estimations and results are statistically 
significant. Therefore, the conditions in the data plans are closely related to the downlink speed. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis analyzed the incentive in the telecommunications market with the traits of 
the network and we showed that the incentive influences indirectly. We also analyzed to what 
degree the qualitative factors affect the market. The normative reviews showed the direct effect 
to the price and the quantity, and we tried to find the influential and additional factors in 
practices in the market, and we showed the indirect effects as the incentive exists in the practice 
of the year(s) contract that we strongly are encouraged by the telecom operators.  
The incentive described in the empirical model showed that the factors we considered 
are statistically significant and we got preferable results. The relationship between the factors in 
the empirical analysis implies that the factors affect the retail price, ARPU, and the Bit/Data cap 
and the downlink speed. And those factors shown are also influence other factors as 
independent variables in other models in this thesis. 
In 4.3, we considerd logit and probit models which could set a threshold of bit/data cap 
at different levels derived from sample basic statistics: the standard deviation level, the mean 
level,  the 5GB level, and the 2GB level. The cap set at the mean level showed the most reliable 
results the logit model. the dispersion of the dataset may influence the reliability. the good 
results in the logit model may come from the mean value itself because the mean value is a 
statistically favorable data. The mean level of the Bit/Data cap is almost the same amount of the 
bit/data cap that is popular in Japan. 
 The results in the probit model showed that the bit/data cap at 5GB is the most reliable. 
the the cap at the mean level was the second reliable results. The cause of the most reliable 
results in the probit model in the 5GB level seem to be the same reason but the different view. 
The bit/datacap at 5GB level is the level that is popular in the US and other countries. Taking 
the non-linear characteristics of the probit model into consideration, 5GB is set deliberatelyby 
operators. Setting the cap at 5GB was not that rational in our analysis, so the dataset may show 
some dispersion by the arbiterariness of operators. 
Furthermore, PMBIT showed negative value in the logit madel, while the factor showed 
positive in the probit model. This may be caused by the dataset. That is why, the probit model is 
preferable because the probit model is non-linear estimation. 
As shown in 4.4, the estimations and the results in the newer data showed that the 
downlink speed showed close relationships with the factors we set. In other words, various 
services could be provided if the conditons were highly related and highly differentiated 
according to the downlink speed. However, the charging scheme in the wireline optical fiber 
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access services and wireless data services could be possible to differentiate those services 
according to the generations of its standards, but the differentiation of services  is not enough in 
the market in practice. 
As we also showed in section 4.4, customers may choose a technology less than  their 
willingness to pay unless the downlink shows some diversification even though the 
diversification in the downlink speed corellates the price. In this case, there is no loss for the 
installed base, but  the transition to the newer technology may cause higher switching costs. 
Consequently, the choice within the willingness to pay may make us difficult to choose a new 
technology. 
As for policymaking, the role of the regulatory agency chaged from rulemaking as a 
market maker to the monitoring agency after the introduction of competition. The market has 
been under the cost reduction incentive since the nationalized and monopolistic market 
conditons in the 1980’s becomes competitive and now shows exponentially growing data 
traffic demand especially in the mobile market. Therefore, more affordable and unconditional 
mobile data comunications are extremely demanded in the market.  
In competition, interferences in any ways in the market are not favorable even though 
the conditions in practice are seemingly distorting the market indirectly or having the power to 
restrict  customer’s freedom in the market. Those conditions are tend to be allowed  as long as 
the conditions are fairly applied, and there is no barriers to terminate or no coersive conditions 
to customers. Therefore, the change in the role for the regulatory agencies implies that there is 
no such a mechanism to correct distortions or malpractices implemented marketwide. 
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Country Company Plan Downkbits Upkbits BitcapMB MinutestoreUSDpricemPMbitsUSDdum_5GB dum_mean dum_dev dum_2GB
Australia Bigpond/TeBigPond Elite 2GB 30720 1000 2000 8.888889 32.68979 1.63449 0 0 0 0
Australia Bigpond/TeBigPond Elite 2GB 20480 1000 2000 13.33333 32.68979 1.08966 0 0 0 0
Australia Bigpond/TeBigPond Turbo 2GB 8192 256 2000 33.33333 26.14529 3.268161 0 0 0 0
Australia Bigpond/TeBigPond Turbo 2GB 1536 128 2000 177.7778 26.14529 17.43019 0 0 0 0
Australia Internode Home-512-Starter 512 128 5000 1333.333 26.14529 52.29058 0 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-NakedExtreme-10 24576 1000 10000 55.55556 32.68979 1.362075 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-UltraBundle-10 20480 820 10000 66.66667 39.20157 1.960079 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-NakedUltra-10 20480 820 10000 66.66667 32.68979 1.63449 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreHigh-15 102400 2000 15000 20 52.3233 0.523233 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreMid-15 51200 8000 15000 40 39.23429 0.784686 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode
Home-FibreEntry-15
(standard plan)
25600 4000 15000 80 32.68979 1.307592 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-Fast-25 24576 1000 25000 138.8889 65.37958 2.724149 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-Standard-25 1536 256 25000 2222.222 52.29058 34.86038 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreHigh-30 102400 0 30000 40 58.8678 0.588678 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreMid-30 51200 1000 30000 80 45.7788 0.915576 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreEntry-30 25600 2000 30000 160 39.23429 1.569372 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-Extreme-30 24576 8000 30000 166.6667 45.74607 1.906086 1 0 0 1
Australia Optus
30GB Broadband  +
Home Phone
20480 4000 30000 200 45.74607 2.287304 1 0 0 1
Australia Bigpond/TeBigPond Turbo 50GB 30720 1000 50000 222.2222 52.3233 1.74411 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Easy Broadband 24576 1000 50000 277.7778 52.29058 2.178774 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-Fast-50 24576 1000 50000 277.7778 85.01309 3.542212 1 0 0 1
Australia Bigpond/TeBigPond Turbo 50GB 20480 1000 50000 333.3333 85.01309 3.542212 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-Standard-50 1536 256 50000 4444.444 58.83508 39.22339 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreHigh-60 102400 2000 60000 80 65.4123 0.654123 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreMid-60 51200 8000 60000 160 52.3233 1.046466 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreEntry-60 25600 4000 60000 320 45.7788 1.831152 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-NakedExtreme-60 24576 1000 60000 333.3333 45.7788 1.90745 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-UltraBundle-60 20480 820 60000 400 52.29058 2.614529 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-NakedUltra-60 20480 820 60000 400 45.7788 2.28894 1 0 0 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreHigh-100 102400 1000 100000 133.3333 78.50131 0.785013 1 1 1 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreMid-100 51200 2000 100000 266.6667 65.4123 1.308246 1 1 1 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreEntry-100 25600 8000 100000 533.3333 58.8678 2.354712 1 1 1 1
Australia Internode
Home-NakedExtreme-
100
24576 4000 100000 555.5556 58.8678 2.452825 1 1 1 1
Australia Internode Home-Fast-100 24576 1000 100000 555.5556 111.1911 4.632963 1 1 1 1
Australia Internode Home-UltraBundle-60 20480 820 100000 666.6667 65.37958 3.268979 1 1 1 1
Australia Internode Home-NakedUltra-100 20480 256 100000 666.6667 58.8678 2.94339 1 1 1 1
Australia Internode Home-Standard-100 1536 820 100000 8888.889 85.01309 56.67539 1 1 1 1
Australia Optus
Naked (Standalone)
Broadband 14 GB
20480 0 120000 800 39.26047 1.963024 1 1 1 1
Australia Optus
Naked (Standalone)
Broadband 30 GB
20480 0 150000 1000 45.80497 2.290249 1 1 1 1
Australia Optus
Naked (Standalone)
Broadband 60 GB
20480 0 170000 1133.333 52.34948 2.617474 1 1 1 1
Australia Internode Home-Fibrehigh-200 102400 1000 200000 266.6667 104.6793 1.046793 1 1 1 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreMid-200 51200 1000 200000 533.3333 87.00916 1.740183 1 1 1 1
Australia Bigpond/TeBigPond Elite 200GB 30720 2000 200000 888.8889 65.4123 3.270615 1 1 1 1
Australia Internode Home-FibreEntry-200 25600 8000 200000 1066.667 85.04581 3.401833 1 1 1 1
Australia Bigpond/TeBigPond Elite 200GB 20480 4000 200000 1333.333 65.4123 3.270615 1 1 1 1
Australia Internode
Home-NakedExtreme-
240
24576 1000 240000 1333.333 71.95681 2.9982 1 1 1 1
Belgium Base home internet 1 1024 256 1000 133.3333 27.68549 27.68549 0 0 0 0
Belgium Telenet BasicNet 4096 400 15000 500 20.93023 5.232558 1 0 0 1
Belgium Belgacom Internet Start 3072 2115.6 15000 666.6667 35.09136 11.69712 1 0 0 1
Belgium Telenet ComfortNet 15360 1000 50000 444.4444 33.93134 2.262089 1 0 0 1
Belgium Belgacom Internet Comfort 12288 1500 50000 555.5556 31.95367 2.662806 1 0 0 1
Belgium Telenet ExpressNet 30720 1250 80000 355.5556 47.51938 1.583979 1 1 0 1
Belgium Belgacom Internet Favorite 25600 3500 100000 533.3333 41.07143 1.642857 1 1 1 1
Canada Bell CanadaEssential Plus 2048 800 2000 133.3333 30.70952 15.35476 0 0 0 0
Canada Rogers Ultra-lite 512 256 2000 533.3333 28.49365 56.98731 0 0 0 0
Canada Shaw High-speed lite 1024 256 13000 1733.333 28.46705 28.46705 1 0 0 1
Canada Rogers Lite 3072 256 15000 666.6667 35.84923 11.94974 1 0 0 1
Canada Bell CanadaPerformance 6144 1000 25000 555.5556 39.90399 6.650665 1 0 0 1
Canada Bell CanadaFibe12 12288 1000 50000 555.5556 46.79984 3.899986 1 0 0 1
Canada Bell Canada
Fibe12 + option 7Mbps
upload
12288 7000 50000 555.5556 51.39707 4.283089 1 0 0 1
Canada Rogers Express 10240 512 60000 800 45.96314 4.596314 1 0 0 1
Canada Bell CanadaFibe25 25600 1000 75000 400 55.9943 3.499644 1 1 0 1
Canada Bell CanadaFibe16 16384 7000 75000 625 60.59154 3.786971 1 1 0 1
Canada Bell Canada
Fibe16 + option 7Mbps
upload
16384 7000 75000 625 64.26933 2.570773 1 1 0 1
Canada Shaw High-speed 7680 512 75000 1333.333 39.7502 5.300027 1 1 0 1
Canada Rogers Extreme 15360 1000 80000 711.1111 61.59374 4.106249 1 1 0 1
Canada Rogers Extreme Plus 25600 1000 125000 666.6667 70.7882 2.831528 1 1 1 1
Canada Shaw High-Speed Extreme 15360 1000 125000 1111.111 48.8633 3.257554 1 1 1 1
Canada Rogers Ultimate 51200 2000 175000 466.6667 98.3716 1.967432 1 1 1 1
Canada Shaw Warp 51200 3000 250000 666.6667 97.51017 1.950203 1 1 1 1
Canada Shaw Nitro 102400 5000 500000 666.6667 145.8096 1.458096 1 1 1 1
Hungary T-Home Kezdo (DSL Kezdo) 5120 2500 1000 26.66667 28.43697 5.687393 0 0 0 0
Hungary T-Home Kezdo (Kabelnet Kezdo) 5120 21838 1000 26.66667 28.43697 5.687393 0 0 0 0
Hungary T-Home Kezdo (Optinet Kezdo) 5120 2918.703 1000 26.66667 28.43697 5.687393 0 0 0 0
Hungary T-Home
Maximum (Kabelnet
Maximum)
81920 500 350000 583.3333 72.49864 0.906233 1 1 1 1
Hungary T-Home Super (Kabelnet Super) 51200 5000 350000 933.3333 66.24876 1.324975 1 1 1 1
Hungary T-Home Extra (Kabelnet Extra) 25600 5000 350000 1866.667 0 0 1 1 1 1
Hungary T-Home Csaladi (Kabelnet Csaladi) 15360 400 350000 3111.111 0 0 1 1 1 1 *
Hungary T-Home Alap (Kabelnet Alap) 5120 400 350000 9333.333 34.99934 6.999869 1 1 1 1 *
Iceland Siminn Grunnaskrift 12288 12000 1000 11.11111 26.19063 2.182553 0 0 0 0 *
Iceland Vodafone Huggulega 1GB 12288 12000 1000 11.11111 26.19063 2.182553 0 0 0 0 *
Iceland TAL DSL 1GB 12288 12000 1000 11.11111 26.19063 2.182553 0 0 0 0 *
Iceland Vodafone
Huggulega netid - meiri
hradi
51200 0 10000 26.66667 0 0 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland TAL FTTH 10GB net 51200 0 10000 26.66667 0 0 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland Siminn Leid 1 12288 12000 10000 111.1111 21.51373 0.430275 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland Vodafone Huggulega 10GB 12288 12000 10000 111.1111 21.51373 0.430275 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland TAL DSL 10GB 12288 12000 10000 111.1111 21.51373 0.430275 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland TAL DSL 20GB 12288 12000 20000 222.2222 37.703 3.141916 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland Vodafone Flotta netid - meiri hradi 51200 50000 30000 80 28.70896 0.574179 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland TAL FTTH 30GB net 51200 50000 30000 80 28.70896 0.574179 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland Vodafone Flotta netid 12288 50000 30000 333.3333 43.45918 3.621598 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland TAL FTTH 60GB net 51200 820 60000 160 33.0261 0.660522 1 0 0 1 *
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*  information are added from telecom operators’ websites 
Source: OECD Communications Outlook 2011, OECD Broadband Statistics Sep. 2010,  
and Telecom Operators’ Websites 
Iceland Siminn Leid 2 12288 12000 60000 666.6667 58.0511 4.837592 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland TAL DSL 60GB 12288 12000 60000 666.6667 44.89822 3.741519 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland Vodafone Ofurnetid - meiri hradi 51200 50000 70000 186.6667 57.13011 1.142602 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland Vodafone Ofurnetid 70GB 12288 50000 70000 777.7778 50.65441 4.221201 1 0 0 1 *
Iceland TAL FTTH 80GB net 51200 50000 80000 213.3333 40.22133 0.804427 1 1 0 1 *
Iceland TAL DSL 80GB 12288 12000 80000 888.8889 52.09345 4.341121 1 1 0 1 *
Iceland Vodafone Enn meira nidurhal 51200 50000 120000 320 59.28868 4.940723 1 1 1 1 *
Iceland TAL FTTH 120GB net 51200 50000 120000 320 59.28868 4.940723 1 1 1 1 *
Iceland Siminn Leid 3 16384 1024 120000 1000 66.68537 4.167836 1 1 1 1 *
Iceland Vodafone Enn meira nidurhal 12288 12000 120000 1333.333 59.28868 4.940723 1 1 1 1 *
Iceland TAL DSL 120GB 12288 12000 120000 1333.333 59.28868 4.940723 1 1 1 1 *
Ireland Eircom
Up to 1Mb home
broadband
1024 1000 10000 1333.333 39.7446 39.7446 1 0 0 1 *
Ireland Irish BroadbImagine up to 1Mb 1024 1000 10000 1333.333 43.32269 43.32269 1 0 0 1
Ireland Irish BroadbImagine up to 3Mb 3072 3000 20000 888.8889 49.56778 16.52259 1 0 0 1
Ireland Irish BroadbImagine up to 7Mb 7782.4 7600 30000 526.3158 59.39096 7.8146 1 0 0 1
Ireland Eircom
Up to 3Mb home
broadband
3072 3000 30000 1333.333 48.23428 16.07809 1 0 0 1
Ireland Eircom
Up to 7Mb home
broadband
7168 7000 50000 952.381 57.15373 8.164819 1 0 0 1
Ireland Eircom
Up to 24Mb home
broadband
24576 24000 75000 416.6667 65.91601 2.746501 1 1 0 1
Ireland UPC Ireland30Mb Broadband Ultra 30720 15000 120000 533.3333 39.04715 2.603143 1 1 1 1
Ireland UPC Ireland15Mb Broadband Express 15360 30000 120000 1066.667 48.87033 1.629011 1 1 1 1
Ireland UPC Ireland8Mb Broadband Value 8192 8000 120000 2000 32.17092 4.021365 1 1 1 1
LuxembourEPT LuxDSL Junior 5120 512 2000 53.33333 53.4606 10.69212 0 0 0 0
LuxembourNumericabl Internet 3 Mega 3072 256 3000 133.3333 33.3682 11.12273 0 0 0 1
LuxembourEPT LuxDSL Run 10240 640 15000 200 72.28905 7.228905 1 0 0 1
New ZealanTelecom Go 24576 0 3000 16.66667 55.62613 2.317756 0 0 0 1
New ZealanVodafone Easy Pack 24576 1000 5000 27.77778 42.34725 1.764469 0 0 0 1
New ZealanTelecom Explorer 24576 0 10000 55.55556 61.67574 2.569823 1 0 0 1
New ZealanVodafone Ideal Pack 24576 1000 10000 55.55556 48.39685 2.016536 1 0 0 1
New ZealanVodafone Ideal Naked 24576 1000 10000 55.55556 48.39685 2.016536 1 0 0 1
New ZealanTelecom Adventure 24576 0 20000 111.1111 67.72535 2.82189 1 0 0 1
New ZealanTelstraCleaLightSpeed 20G 15360 1000 20000 177.7778 33.84755 2.256503 1 0 0 1
New ZealanVodafone Ultimate Pack 24576 1000 30000 166.6667 67.72535 2.82189 1 0 0 1
New ZealanVodafone Ultimate Nacked 24576 1000 30000 166.6667 51.42166 2.142569 1 0 0 1
New ZealanTelecom Pro 24576 1000 40000 222.2222 79.82456 3.326023 1 0 0 1
New ZealanTelstraCleaLightSpeed 40G 15360 0 40000 355.5556 33.84755 2.256503 1 0 0 1
New ZealanTelstraCleaLightSpeed 60G 15360 2000 60000 533.3333 58.04598 3.869732 1 0 0 1
New ZealanTelstraCleaLightSpeed 90G 15360 2000 90000 800 84.66425 5.644283 1 1 1 1
New ZealanTelstraCleaWarpSpeed 120G 25600 2000 120000 640 127.0115 5.08046 1 1 1 1
Portugal Zon Zon Net SD Net 5120 256 10000 266.6667 42.12079 8.424157 1 0 0 1
Portugal Clix
Pack ADSL Net Outras
Zonas + Telefone
1024 128 12000 1600 56.61517 56.61517 1 0 0 1
Portugal Clix
Pack ADSL Net Outras
Zonas + Telefone
8124 512 50000 840.3086 71.9382 9.067543 1 0 0 1
Portugal Clix
Pack Fibra Net +
Telefone
30720 1024 60000 266.6667 26.90602 1.121084 1 0 0 1
Portugal Clix
Pack ADSL Net +
Telefone Sem assinatura
24576 3000 60000 333.3333 40.36575 1.345525 1 0 0 1
Portugal Clix
Pack ADSL Net Outras
Zonas + Telefone
24576 1024 100000 555.5556 98.0618 4.085908 1 1 1 1
Portugal Clix
Pack Fibra Net +
Telefone
102400 10000 200000 266.6667 53.82549 0 1 1 1 1
Portugal Clix
Pack Fibra Net +
Telefone
102400 10000 200000 266.6667 67.28523 0 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com Optik 1 10240 512 2000 26.66667 14.5 1.45 0 0 0 0
Slovak RepT-Com Turbo 2 Mini 2048 256 2000 133.3333 14.5 1.45 0 0 0 0
Slovak RepT-Com
Turbo 2 Mini Solo +
(faster upload)
2048 256 2000 133.3333 19.33871 9.669355 0 0 0 0
Slovak RepT-Com Turbo 2 Mini 2048 512 2000 133.3333 14.5 7.25 0 0 0 0
Slovak RepT-Com
Turbo 2 Mini + (faster
upload)
2048 512 2000 133.3333 14.5 7.25 0 0 0 0
Slovak RepT-Com Optik 2 20480 1000 120000 800 25.3871 1.269355 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com Turbo 3 Solo 3584 256 120000 4571.429 37.48387 10.70968 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com
Turbo 3 Solo + (faster
upload)
3584 512 120000 4571.429 37.48387 10.70968 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com Turbo 3 3584 256 120000 4571.429 35.06452 10.01843 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com Turbo 3 + (faster upload) 3584 512 120000 4571.429 35.06452 10.01843 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com Turbo 2 Solo 2048 256 120000 8000 27.80645 13.90323 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com
Turbo 2 Solo + (faster
upload)
2048 512 120000 8000 27.80645 13.90323 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com Turbo 2 2048 256 120000 8000 25.3871 12.69355 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com Turbo 2 + (faster upload) 2048 512 120000 8000 25.3871 12.69355 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com Optik 4 81920 2000 240000 400 45.95161 0.574395 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com Optik 3 40960 4000 240000 800 36.27419 0.906855 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com Turbo 4 Solo 12288 512 240000 2666.667 48.37097 4.030914 1 1 1 1
Slovak RepT-Com Turbo 4 12288 512 240000 2666.667 45.95161 3.829301 1 1 1 1
Spain Telefonica Movistar kit ADSL Mini 1024 320 2000 266.6667 51.23923 51.23923 0 0 0 0
Spain Telefonica Movistar kit ADSL 1 Mb 1024 256 20000 2666.667 66.36744 66.36744 1 0 0 1
Turkey Turksat/Uy10 Mbps'e kadar limitli 10240 0 1000 13.33333 20.33133 2.033133 0 0 0 0
Turkey Turksat/Uy5 Mbps'e kadar limitli 5120 0 1000 26.66667 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey Turksat/Uy1 Mbps'e kadar limitli 1024 0 1000 133.3333 14.30723 14.30723 0 0 0 0
Turkey Superonline1 Mbps'e kadar limitli 10240 1000 4000 53.33333 20.64445 2.064445 0 0 0 1
Turkey Superonline8 Mbps’e kadar  4GB 8192 1000 4000 66.66667 38.27466 4.784333 0 0 0 1
Turkey Turk Teleko   NET4 8192 1000 4000 66.66667 21.83735 2.729669 0 0 0 1
Turkey Turk Teleko   NET4 (Plus)* 8192 1000 4000 66.66667 23.34337 2.917922 0 0 0 1
Turkey Superonline8 Mbps’e kadar  6GB 8192 1000 6000 100 38.27466 4.784333 1 0 0 1
Turkey Turk Teleko   NET6 8192 1000 6000 100 29.36747 3.670934 1 0 0 1
Turkey SuperonlineNET6 20480 5000 8000 53.33333 27.54706 1.377353 1 0 0 1
Turkey SuperonlineNET6 50480 5000 12000 32.45642 41.35228 0.838842 1 0 0 1
Turkey Superonline8 Mbps Limitsiz 8192 250 15000 250 84.77316 10.59664 1 0 0 1
Turkey Superonline8 Mbps’e kadar  Limitsiz 8192 512 15000 250 44.86352 5.60794 1 0 0 1
Turkey Turk Teleko   8 Mbps’e kadar  Limitsiz 8192 1000 15000 250 36.89759 4.612199 1 0 0 1
Turkey Superonline4 Mbps Limitsiz 4096 1000 15000 500 72.83509 18.20877 1 0 0 1
Turkey Superonline2 Mbps Limitsiz 2048 1000 15000 1000 58.76318 29.38159 1 0 0 1
Turkey Superonline1 Mbps Limitsiz 1024 1000 15000 2000 44.69785 44.69785 1 0 0 1
Turkey Superonline1 Mbps Limitsiz 102400 5000 16000 21.33333 62.06012 0.620601 1 0 0 1
Turkey Superonline1 Mbps Limitsiz 10240 1000 50000 666.6667 34.44967 3.444967 1 0 0 1
Turkey Superonline1 Mbps Limitsiz 20480 5000 100000 666.6667 48.2549 2.412745 1 1 1 1
Turkey Superonline1 Mbps Limitsiz 50480 5000 250000 676.1754 68.96273 1.398927 1 1 1 1
Turkey Superonline1 Mbps Limitsiz 102400 5000 500000 666.6667 137.9888 1.379888 1 1 1 1
United KingBT Option 1 20480 0 10000 66.66667 38.14371 1.907186 1 0 0 1
United KingBT BT Infinity Option 1 40960 2000 40000 133.3333 44.13174 1.103293 1 0 0 1
United KingBT Option 2 20480 0 40000 266.6667 45.62874 2.281437 1 0 0 1
United KingSky
Sky Broadband Unlimited
with Sky Talk
20480 1300 40000 266.6667 31.43713 1.571856 1 0 0 1
United KingSky
Sky Broadband Unlimited
without Sky Talk
20480 1300 40000 266.6667 22.45509 1.122755 1 0 0 1
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Country Company Type Plan Downkbits Upkbits BitcapMB MON PMBIT cap_up cap_PMb cap_mon up_mon up_PMb mon_PMb
Australia Internode A Easy Naked 1000 24576 2048 1000000 96.19 3.91 2.05E+09 3914155 9.62E+07 197005.8 8016.188 376.5192
Australia Internode F NBNTP Bronze 1000 12288 1024 1000000 94.81 7.72 1.02E+09 7715398 9.48E+07 97082.17 7900.567 731.4723
Australia Internode F NBNTP Silver 1000 25600 5120 1000000 101.13 3.95 5.12E+09 3950366 1.01E+08 517782.4 20225.88 399.498
Australia Internode F NBNTP Gold 1000 51200 20480 1000000 107.45 2.1 2.05E+10 2098671 1.07E+08 2200616 42980.77 225.5062
Australia Internode F NBNTP Platinum 1000 102400 40960 1000000 120.1 1.17 4.10E+10 1172823 1.20E+08 4919176 48038.82 140.8526
Australia Optus A 500GB Naked 20480 640 500000 69.46 3.39 3.20E+08 1695741 3.47E+07 44452.84 2170.549 235.5641
Australia BigPond/T A
Elite Liberty 500GB
Standalone (without Telstra
20480 1024 500000 98.27 4.8 5.12E+08 2399153 4.91E+07 100627.8 4913.464 471.5261
Australia BigPond/T C
Elite Liberty 500GB
Standalone (without Telstra
30720 1024 500000 98.27 3.2 5.12E+08 1599435 4.91E+07 100627.8 3275.643 314.3507
Australia Internode A Easy Naked 300 24576 2048 300000 64.58 2.63 6.14E+08 788347.8 1.94E+07 132262.8 5381.788 169.7088
Australia Internode F NBNTP Bronze 300 12288 1024 300000 63.19 5.14 3.07E+08 1542822 1.90E+07 64710.66 5266.167 324.9904
Australia Internode F NBNTP Silver 300 25600 5120 300000 69.52 2.72 1.54E+09 814647.3 2.09E+07 355924.8 13903.31 188.7716
Australia Internode F NBNTP Gold 300 51200 20480 300000 75.84 1.48 6.14E+09 444369.9 2.28E+07 1553185 30335.65 112.3354
Australia Internode F NBNTP Platinum 300 102400 40960 300000 88.48 0.86 1.23E+10 259231.2 2.65E+07 3624315 35393.7 76.45959
Australia Internode A Easy Reach 250 20480 1024 250000 104.38 5.1 2.56E+08 1274194 2.61E+07 106887.1 5219.099 532.0116
Australia BigPond/T A
Elite Liberty 200GB
Standalone (without Telstra
20480 1024 200000 85.62 4.18 2.05E+08 836173.5 1.71E+07 87679.15 4281.208 357.9833
Australia BigPond/T C
Elite Liberty 200GB
Standalone (without Telstra
30720 1024 200000 85.62 2.79 2.05E+08 557449 1.71E+07 87679.15 2854.139 238.6555
Australia Internode A Easy Naked 200 24576 2048 200000 51.94 2.11 4.10E+08 422658.9 1.04E+07 106365.6 4328.027 109.7568
Australia Internode F NBNTP Bronze 200 12288 1024 200000 50.55 4.11 2.05E+08 822735.7 1.01E+07 51762.05 4212.407 207.9418
Australia Internode F NBNTP Silver 200 25600 5120 200000 56.87 2.22 1.02E+09 444308.1 1.14E+07 291181.8 11374.29 126.3422
Australia Internode F NBNTP Gold 200 51200 20480 200000 63.19 1.23 4.10E+09 246851.6 1.26E+07 1294213 25277.6 77.9977
Australia Internode F NBNTP Platinum 200 102400 40960 200000 75.84 0.74 8.19E+09 148123.3 1.52E+07 3106371 30335.65 56.16771
Australia Optus A 150GB Naked 20480 640 150000 63.13 3.08 9.60E+07 462414.5 9470249 40406.39 1972.969 194.6302
Australia Optus A 120GB Naked 20480 640 120000 56.81 2.77 7.68E+07 332885.3 6817492 36359.96 1775.388 157.6002
Australia Internode A Easy Reach 100 20480 1024 100000 72.77 3.55 1.02E+08 355318.2 7276917 74515.63 3638.458 258.5621
Australia Internode A Easy Reach 60 20480 1024 60000 60.12 2.94 6.14E+07 176144.7 3607443 61567.02 3006.202 176.5089
Australia BigPond/T A
Elite Liberty 50GB
Standalone (without Telstra
20480 1024 50000 72.98 3.56 5.12E+07 178171.5 3648952 74730.54 3648.952 260.0557
Australia BigPond/T C
Elite Liberty 50GB
Standalone (without Telstra
30720 1024 50000 72.98 2.38 5.12E+07 118781 3648952 74730.54 2432.635 173.3705
Australia Internode A Easy Naked 30 24576 2048 30000 39.29 1.6 6.14E+07 47962.9 1178736 80468.39 3274.267 62.81734
Australia Internode F NBNTP Bronze 30 12288 1024 30000 37.9 3.08 3.07E+07 92538.47 1137113 38813.45 3158.646 116.9185
Australia Internode F NBNTP Silver 30 25600 5120 30000 44.23 1.73 1.54E+08 51827.72 1326790 226438.8 8845.264 76.40497
Australia Internode F NBNTP Gold 30 51200 20480 30000 50.55 0.99 6.14E+08 29618.48 1516466 1035241 20219.55 49.90604
Australia Internode F NBNTP Platinum 30 102400 40960 30000 63.19 0.62 1.23E+09 18513.87 1895820 2588426 25277.6 38.99885
Australia BigPond/T A
Elite Liberty 5GB Standalone
(without Telstra phone
20480 1024 5000 60.33 2.95 5120000 14729.96 301669.6 61781.94 3016.696 177.7433
Australia BigPond/T C
Elite Liberty 5GB Standalone
(without Telstra phone
30720 1024 5000 60.33 1.96 5120000 9819.975 301669.6 61781.94 2011.131 118.4955
Australia Internode A Easy Reach 5 20480 1024 5000 53.8 2.63 5120000 13135.13 269007.4 55092.72 2690.074 141.3379
Austria Tele2 A ADSL 3GB 2048 384 3000 44.52 21.74 1152000 65214.82 133560 17095.67 8347.497 967.7875
Belgium Belgacom A Internet Comfort 15360 2560 100000 37.21 2.42 2.56E+08 242238.2 3720779 95251.93 6201.297 90.13146
Belgium Telenet F Fibernet 50000 2048 100000 50.25 1.01 2.05E+08 100508.5 5025425 102920.7 2058.414 50.50979
Belgium Belgacom A Internet Start 3072 400 50000 28.56 9.3 2.00E+07 464914.8 1428218 11425.75 3719.319 265.6
Belgium Telenet C Basicnet 20480 1280 50000 28.56 1.39 6.40E+07 69737.23 1428218 36562.39 1785.273 39.83999
Belgium Base A Home Internet 1 1024 0 1000 37.15 36.28 0 36278.77 37149.46 0 0 1347.737
Canada Shaw C Broadband 250 256000 15360 1000000 97.62 0.38 1.54E+10 381314.6 9.76E+07 1499390 5856.991 37.2226
Canada Shaw C Broadband 100+ 102400 5120 750000 80.62 0.79 3.84E+09 590514.9 6.05E+07 412799.8 4031.248 63.48032
Canada Shaw C Broadband 100 102400 5120 500000 72.13 0.7 2.56E+09 352193.3 3.61E+07 369301.4 3606.459 50.80682
Canada Shaw C Broadband 50 51200 3072 400000 63.63 1.24 1.23E+09 497135.9 2.55E+07 195481.8 3818.004 79.08613
Canada Shaw C Extreme 25600 1024 250000 50.13 1.96 2.56E+08 489503 1.25E+07 51328.11 2005.004 98.14557
Canada Rogers C Ultimate 51200 2048 250000 87.66 1.71 5.12E+08 428031.7 2.19E+07 179529.5 3506.435 150.0865
Canada Rogers C Extreme Plus 32768 1024 150000 62.17 1.9 1.54E+08 284607.9 9326031 63665.71 1942.923 117.9672
Canada Shaw C High Speed 7680 512 125000 41.63 5.42 6.40E+07 677560.7 5203666 21314.21 2775.289 225.6512
Canada Rogers C Extreme 24576 1024 100000 53.68 2.18 1.02E+08 218415.4 5367776 54966.03 2236.573 117.2405
Canada Bell A Fibe 16 16384 1024 75000 53.34 3.26 7.68E+07 244162.8 4000363 54618.28 3333.635 173.6426
Canada Bell A Fibe 25 25600 7168 75000 61.83 2.42 5.38E+08 181154.1 4637546 443225.7 17313.51 149.353
Canada Rogers C Express 12288 512 60000 42.63 3.47 3.07E+07 208170.1 2557995 21828.22 1776.385 147.9162
Canada Bell A Fibe 12 12288 1024 50000 44.84 3.65 5.12E+07 182464.1 2242119 45918.6 3736.865 163.6425
Canada Shaw C High Speed Lite 1024 256 30000 31.43 30.7 7680000 920929.4 943031.7 8047.204 7858.598 964.9618
Canada Bell A Performance 6144 1024 25000 37.76 6.15 2.56E+07 153656.3 944064.2 38668.87 6293.761 232.0982
Canada Rogers C Lite 3072 256 15000 33.29 10.84 3840000 162538.5 499318.3 8521.699 2773.99 360.7042
Canada Bell A Essential Plus 2048 800 2000 29.27 14.29 1600000 28580.85 58533.57 23413.43 11432.34 418.2347
Canada Rogers C Ultra Ligt 512 256 2000 26.49 51.74 512000 103481.5 52982.52 6781.763 13245.63 1370.678
Chile VTR C Banda Ancha Mega 1 1024 512 3000 30.74 30.01 1536000 90044.15 92205.21 15736.36 15367.53 922.5043
Denmark Stofa.dk C FlatRate 110000/11000 110000 11000 500000 51.24 0.47 5.50E+09 232901.5 2.56E+07 563621.6 5123.833 23.86696
Hungary UPC F Fiber Power 10 10240 1024 5120000 15.87 1.55 5.24E+09 7935725 8.13E+07 16252.37 1587.145 24.5999
Hungary T-Home C DSL Kezdo 5120 512 1000 23.88 4.66 512000 4664.119 23880.29 12226.71 2388.029 111.3805
Hungary T-Home A DSL Kezdo 5120 512 1000 23.88 4.66 512000 4664.119 23880.29 12226.71 2388.029 111.3805
Hungary T-Home F DSL Kezdo 5120 2560 1000 23.88 4.66 2560000 4664.119 23880.29 61133.54 11940.15 111.3805
Iceland Siminn A Leid 4 - 4 - without 51200 15360 140000 62.17 1.21 2.15E+09 169994 8703694 954919.6 18650.77 75.48858
Iceland Vodafone A Internet 140 without 12288 1024 140000 59.8 4.87 1.43E+08 681313.3 8371977 61235.03 4983.32 291.0173
Iceland Siminn A Leid 4 - 4 - without 16384 1024 120000 65.65 4.01 1.23E+08 480832.7 7877963 67225.28 4103.105 263.0543
Iceland Hringidan A ADSL 18Mb/120GB without 18432 1024 120000 63.44 3.44 1.23E+08 413000.7 7612428 64959.39 3524.272 218.329
Iceland Siminn A Leid 3 - 3 - without 51200 15360 80000 53.82 1.05 1.23E+09 84087.78 4305295 826616.5 16144.85 56.56604
Iceland Vodafone A Internet 80 without 12288 1024 80000 52.14 4.24 8.19E+07 339471.7 4171429 53394.29 4345.238 221.2628
Iceland Hringidan A ADSL 12Mb/80GB without 12288 1024 80000 54.7 4.45 8.19E+07 356126.2 4376079 56013.81 4558.416 243.5057
Iceland Siminn A Leid 3 - 3 - without 12288 820 60000 57.3 4.66 4.92E+07 279768.7 3437798 46983.23 3823.505 267.1633
Iceland Siminn A Leid 2 - 2 - without 51200 15360 50000 46.86 0.92 7.68E+08 45757.12 2342765 719697.3 14056.59 42.87926
Iceland Siminn A Leid 2 - 2 - without 12288 820 40000 50.34 4.1 3.28E+07 163853.3 2013429 41275.3 3358.993 206.1919
Iceland Vodafone A Internet 40 without 12288 1024 40000 44.49 3.62 4.10E+07 144810.8 1779435 45553.54 3707.157 161.0509
Iceland Hringidan A ADSL 12Mb/40GB without 12288 1024 40000 45.97 3.74 4.10E+07 149625.9 1838603 47068.23 3830.422 171.9391
Iceland Hringidan A ADSL 12Mb/20GB without 12288 1024 20000 42.28 3.44 2.05E+07 68808.27 845515.9 43290.42 3522.983 145.4462
Iceland Siminn A Leid 1 - 1 - without 12288 640 10000 43.37 3.53 6400000 35298.54 433748.5 27759.9 2259.106 153.1069
Iceland Siminn A Leid 1 - 1 - without 51200 15360 10000 39.89 0.78 1.54E+08 7791.875 398944 612778 11968.32 31.08522
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Iceland Vodafone A Internet 10 without 12288 1024 10000 36.83 3 1.02E+07 29971.44 368289 37712.8 3069.075 110.3815
Iceland Vodafone A Internet 0 without 6000 1024 4000 21.51 3.59 4096000 14343.3 86059.79 22031.31 3671.884 77.14883
Iceland Siminn A
Grunnaskrift - Basic -
without homephone
12288 382 1000 79.57 6.48 382000 6475.542 79571.47 30396.3 2473.657 515.2684
Ireland Vodafone A Ultimate Broadband 24576 512 350000 56.32 2.29 1.79E+08 802034.7 1.97E+07 28834.09 1173.262 129.051
Ireland Vodafone A Ideal Broadband 8192 512 300000 49.26 6.01 1.54E+08 1803809 1.48E+07 25219.07 3078.5 296.1613
Ireland Eircom A 7MB 7168 384 50000 66.56 9.29 1.92E+07 464262.5 3327834 25557.76 3565.536 617.9955
Ireland Vodafone A Value Broadband 8192 512 40000 41.19 5.03 2.05E+07 201107.2 1647470 21087.62 2574.172 207.0739
Ireland Eircom A 3MB 3072 384 30000 56.64 18.44 1.15E+07 553140.6 1699248 21750.37 7080.2 1044.359
Ireland Eircom A 1MB 1024 128 10000 51.6 50.39 1280000 503889.8 515983.2 6604.585 6449.79 2599.987
Ireland Eircom A Next Generation Broadband 8192 512 10000 26.02 3.18 5120000 31761.26 260188.2 13321.64 1626.176 82.63905
LuxembourVisual OnlinA Vodsl Starter 5120 512 500000 46.31 9.05 2.56E+08 4522635 2.32E+07 23711.63 4631.178 418.9026
LuxembourP&T A SpeedSurf Run - LuxDSL 10240 640 15000 48.08 4.7 9600000 70428.56 721188.5 30770.71 3004.952 225.7434
LuxembourNumericablA Internet 10 Mega 10240 256 10000 43.76 4.27 2560000 42734.43 437600.6 11202.58 1094.001 187.0061
LuxembourP&T A SpeedSurf Junior - LuxDSL 5120 512 2000 29.67 5.79 1024000 11588.25 59331.82 15188.95 2966.591 171.8879
New ZealanTelstraCleaA WarpSpeed 120G 25600 2048 120000 90.67 3.54 2.46E+08 425004.6 1.09E+07 185687.3 7253.411 321.118
New ZealanNZ TelecomA
Total Home Broadband
100GB (with speed
24576 1024 100000 91.68 3.73 1.02E+08 373058.4 9168283 93883.21 3820.118 342.0305
New ZealanNZ TelecomA
Total Home Broadband
100GB (without speed
24576 1024 100000 91.68 3.73 1.02E+08 373058.4 9168283 93883.21 3820.118 342.0305
New ZealanTelstraCleaA LightSpeed 90G 15360 2048 90000 65.38 4.26 1.84E+08 383061.5 5883825 133889.7 8716.777 278.2551
New ZealanVodafone A Ultimate pack (Double Your 24576 1024 90000 82.58 3.36 9.22E+07 302408.8 7432000 84559.64 3440.74 277.4694
New ZealanNZ TelecomA
Total Home Broadband 80GB
(with speed reduction)
24576 1024 80000 79.04 3.22 8.19E+07 257281.6 6322954 80933.8 3293.205 254.1844
New ZealanNZ TelecomA
Total Home Broadband 80GB
(without speed reduction)
24576 1024 80000 79.04 3.22 8.19E+07 257281.6 6322954 80933.8 3293.205 254.1844
New ZealanNZ TelecomA
Total Home Broadband
(without speed reduction)
24576 1024 60000 66.39 2.7 6.14E+07 162087.4 3983461 67984.4 2766.292 179.3525
New ZealanTelstraCleaA LightSpeed 60G 15360 2048 60000 52.73 3.43 1.23E+08 205976.3 3163795 107990.9 7030.656 181.0185
New ZealanVodafone A Ultimate pack 24576 1024 45000 63.23 2.57 4.61E+07 115776.7 2845329 64747.04 2634.564 162.678
New ZealanNZ TelecomA Adventure 24576 1024 40000 80.68 3.28 4.10E+07 131316.5 3227236 82617.23 3361.704 264.8684
New ZealanTelstraCleaA LightSpeed 40G 15360 2048 40000 46.41 3.02 8.19E+07 120851.5 1856279 95041.47 6187.596 140.2088
New ZealanVodafone A Ideal pack (Double Your 24576 1024 30000 69.81 2.84 3.07E+07 85211.68 2094162 71480.73 2908.559 198.2745
New ZealanTelstraCleaA
Call Local with Broadband
with 25GB usage pack
24576 256 25000 69.36 2.82 6400000 70555.02 1733960 17755.75 722.4835 195.7434
New ZealanNZ TelecomA
Total Home Mobile (with
speed reduction)
24576 1024 20000 62.6 2.55 2.05E+07 50941.77 1251945 64099.57 2608.218 159.4407
New ZealanNZ TelecomA Total Home (without speed 24576 1024 20000 64.49 2.62 2.05E+07 52485.45 1289883 66041.98 2687.255 169.2502
New ZealanTelstraCleaA LightSpeed 20G 15360 2048 20000 40.08 2.61 4.10E+07 52192.73 801680.3 82092.05 5344.535 104.6047
New ZealanVodafone A Easy pack (Double Your 24576 1024 16000 57.03 2.32 1.64E+07 37130.89 912528.7 58401.84 2376.377 132.3555
New ZealanVodafone A Ideal pack 24576 1024 15000 56.91 2.32 1.54E+07 34733.02 853598.8 58272.34 2371.108 131.7692
New ZealanNZ TelecomA Total Home Lite (with speed 24576 1024 10000 52.48 2.14 1.02E+07 21354.38 524805.1 53740.05 2186.688 112.0689
New ZealanNZ TelecomA
Total Home Lite (without
speed reduction)
24576 1024 10000 52.48 2.14 1.02E+07 21354.38 524805.1 53740.05 2186.688 112.0689
New ZealanTelstraCleaA
Call Local with Broadband
with 10GB usage pack
24576 256 10000 59.87 2.44 2560000 24362.79 598739.8 15327.74 623.6873 145.8697
New ZealanVodafone A Easy pack 24576 1024 8000 50.58 2.06 8192000 16466.03 404669 51797.64 2107.651 104.1139
New ZealanVodafone A Basic pack (Double Your 256 128 6000 48.35 188.85 768000 1133110 290076 6188.289 24173 9130.22
New ZealanNZ TelecomA Go 24576 1024 5000 68.03 2.77 5120000 13841.75 340174.9 69667.82 2834.791 188.3447
New ZealanTelstraCleaA
Call Local with Broadband
with 3GB usage pack
24576 256 3000 54.82 2.23 768000 6691.359 164446.8 14032.8 570.996 122.2637
New ZealanVodafone A Basic pack 256 128 3000 45.12 176.26 384000 528765.3 135363.9 5775.526 22560.65 7952.858
New ZealanNZ TelecomA Total Starter Plan (with 24576 1024 2000 47.9 1.95 2048000 3897.817 95792.75 49045.89 1995.682 93.34564
New ZealanTelstraCleaA Maximum Speed Broadband + 24576 256 1000 55.51 2.26 256000 2258.651 55508.61 14210.21 578.2147 125.3746
Portugal PT A SAPO ADSL 24Mb - Zonas 24000 1024 50000 32.08 1.34 5.12E+07 66824.84 1603796 32845.75 1368.573 42.86937
Portugal PT A SAPO ADSL 12Mb - Zonas 12000 1024 30000 25.58 2.13 3.07E+07 63946.82 767361.9 26192.62 2182.718 54.52262
Slovak RepT-Com A Turbo 1 Solo 2048 384 2000 24.26 11.85 768000 23690.93 48519.03 9315.653 4548.659 287.3653
Slovak RepT-Com F Optik 1 10240 1024 2000 33.37 3.26 2048000 6518.009 66744.41 34173.14 3337.221 108.7602
Turkey SuperonlineA
Superonline ADSL 8Mbps
unlimited (100GB)
8192 1024 100000 114.07 13.92 1.02E+08 1392406 1.14E+07 116803.5 14258.24 1588.26
Turkey SuperonlineA
Superonline ADSL 8Mbps
unlimited (25GB)
8192 1024 25000 83.62 10.21 2.56E+07 255177.5 2090414 85623.34 10452.07 853.4824
Turkey TTNet F FiberNET 100 Mb 20GB 102400 1024 20000 89 0.87 2.05E+07 17382.15 1779932 91132.51 889.9659 77.34758
Turkey SuperonlineF Fiber 100 mbps 16GB 102400 5120 16000 97.24 0.95 8.19E+07 15193.97 1555863 497876.1 4862.071 92.34271
Turkey TTNet A Daily internet 1Mbps/500 mb 1024 256 15208.33 84.76 82.77 3893333 1258773 1288984 21697.31 21188.78 7015.067
Turkey TTNet F FiberNET 50 Mb 15GB 51200 1024 15000 62.21 1.22 1.54E+07 18225.09 933124.8 63701.32 1244.166 75.58349
Turkey SuperonlineF Fiber 50 mbps 12GB 51200 5120 12000 70.45 1.38 6.14E+07 16512.46 845437.8 360720.1 7045.315 96.94622
Turkey TTNet F FiberNET 32 Mb 10GB 32768 1024 10000 38.99 1.19 1.02E+07 11899.36 389918.2 39927.62 1218.494 46.39775
Turkey SuperonlineF Fiber 20 mbps 8GB 20480 5120 8000 52.59 2.57 4.10E+07 20544.65 420754.4 269282.8 13148.58 135.0665
Turkey SuperonlineA Superonline ADSL 8 Mbps 8192 1024 6000 46.34 5.66 6144000 33943.14 278062.3 47455.96 5792.963 262.1752
Turkey TTNet A Net 6 / 6GB 8192 1024 6000 29.17 3.56 6144000 21364.34 175016.7 29869.52 3646.181 103.8644
Turkey TTNet A 1 Mbps / 6 GB 1024 256 6000 32.8 32.03 1536000 192209.3 196822.3 8397.754 8200.932 1050.864
Turkey TTNet A 2 Mbps / 6 GB 2048 512 6000 41.05 20.05 3072000 120276.9 246327.1 21019.91 10263.63 822.9849
Turkey SuperonlineA Superonline ADSL 16 Mbps 16384 1024 5000 47.24 2.88 5120000 14415.48 236183.3 48370.33 2952.291 136.1878
Turkey TTNet A 16 Mbps/ 5GB 16384 4096 5000 30.06 1.83 2.05E+07 9174.314 150312 123135.6 7515.598 55.16037
Turkey SuperonlineF Fiber 10 mbps 4GB 10240 1024 4000 43.66 4.26 4096000 17056.59 174659.5 44712.84 4366.488 186.1935
Turkey SuperonlineF Fiber 20 mbps 4GB 20480 5120 4000 48.13 2.35 2.05E+07 9400.311 192518.4 246423.5 12032.4 113.1083
Turkey SuperonlineA Superonline ADSL 8 Mbps 8192 1024 4000 43.66 5.33 4096000 21320.74 174659.5 44712.84 5458.11 232.7419
Turkey TTNet A Net 4 / 4GB 8192 1024 4000 26.49 3.23 4096000 12934.87 105962.5 27126.4 3311.328 85.66322
Turkey TTNet A 1 Mbps to / 4 GB 1024 256 4000 24.54 23.96 1024000 95840.15 98140.31 6280.98 6133.77 587.8615
Turkey TTNet A 2 Mbps / 4 GB 2048 512 4000 29.17 14.24 2048000 56971.58 116677.8 14934.76 7292.362 415.4574
Turkey SuperonlineF Fiber 20 mbps 2GB 20480 5120 2000 40 1.95 1.02E+07 3906.623 80007.63 204819.5 10000.95 78.13991
Turkey SuperonlineA Superonline ADSL 1 Mbps 1024 256 2000 40 39.07 512000 78132.45 80007.63 10240.98 10000.95 1562.798
Turkey TTNet A 1 Mbps / 2 GB 1024 256 2000 22.83 22.29 512000 44588.98 45659.12 5844.367 5707.39 508.9734
Turkey SuperonlineF Fiber 20 mbps 1GB 20480 5120 1000 44.84 2.19 5120000 2189.662 44844.28 229602.7 11211.07 98.19382
Turkey SuperonlineA Superonline ADSL 1 Mbps 1024 256 1000 44.84 43.79 256000 43793.24 44844.28 11480.14 11211.07 1963.876
Turkey TTNet A 1 Mbps / 1 GB 1024 256 1000 29.97 29.27 256000 29270.83 29973.33 7673.171 7493.332 877.3441
Turkey Turksat/UyC 1Mbps'e kadar 1024 256 1000 14.08 13.75 256000 13752.15 14082.2 3605.042 3520.549 193.6604
Turkey Turksat/UyC 5Mbps'e kadar 5120 1024 1000 17.65 3.45 1024000 3448.04 17653.97 18077.66 3530.793 60.87159
Turkey Turksat/UyC 10Mbps'e kadar 10240 1024 1000 21.23 2.07 1024000 2072.826 21225.74 21735.15 2122.573 43.99725
United KingBT A More Broadband and Calls 20480 256 40000 40.44 1.97 1.02E+07 78990.3 1617721 10353.42 505.5379 79.86517
United KingBT F
More Broadband and Calls
with superfast BT Infinity
40960 2048 40000 40.44 0.99 8.19E+07 39495.15 1617721 82827.33 2022.152 39.93259
United KingBT A Broadband and Evening & 20480 256 10000 33.18 1.62 2560000 16202.59 331829.1 8494.825 414.7864 53.76492
United KingSky A Everyday Lite + TV 20480 1300 2000 51.79 2.53 2600000 5058.095 103589.8 67333.36 3287.761 130.9917
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